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In the last quarter of 2014, several successful attacks against mobile networks were 
demonstrated. They are based on misuse of one of the key signaling protocol, SS7, which is 
extensively used in the mobile communication backend for signaling tasks such as call and 
mobility management. The attackers were able to locate the mobile users and intercept voice 
calls and text messages. While most attacks in the public eye are those which exploits 
weaknesses in the end-device software or radio access links, these recently demonstrated 
vulnerabilities exploit weaknesses of the mobile core networks themselves. Understandably, 
there is a scramble in the mobile telecommunications industry to understand the attacks and 
the underlying vulnerabilities. This thesis is part of that effort.  
This thesis presents a broad and thorough overview and analysis of the known attacks against 
mobile network signaling protocols and the possible mitigation strategies. The attacks are 
presented in a uniform way, in relation to the mobile network protocol standards and 
signaling scenarios. Moreover, this thesis also presents a new attack that enables a malicious 
party with access to the signaling network to remove lost or stolen phones from the blacklist 
that is intended to prevent their use. Both the known and new attacks have been confirmed by 
implementing them in a controlled test environment.  
The attacks are serious because SS7, despite its age, remains the main signaling protocol in 
the mobile networks and will still long be required for interoperability and background 
compatibility in international roaming. Moreover, the number of entities with access to the 
core network, and hence the number of potential attackers, has increased significantly 
because of changes in regulation and opening of the networks to competition. The analysis 
and new results of this thesis will help mobile network providers and operators to assess the 
vulnerabilities in their infrastructure and to make security-aware decisions regarding their 
future investments and standardization. The results will be presented to the operators, 
network-equipment vendors, and to the 3GPP standards body. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
With the near-ubiquitous coverage of cellular networks and more affordable smart phones, the 
number of mobile users is increasing day by day. The telecommunication sector is growing 
continuously with a total of 3.6 billion unique mobile subscribers at the end of year 2014 [1]. 
At present, half of the world population is using mobile phones and subscriptions in their day 
to day life, and it is estimated that an additional of one billion mobile subscribers will be using 
telecommunication services at the end of year 2020. 
In today's world, mobile networks have not only become the most vital part of communication 
infrastructure but also a major driving force behind global economic progress and welfare. 
Mobile communication systems have become a crucial part of the daily activities of most 
people ranging from voice calls, text messages and Internet access to providing emergency call 
services. In this context, assuring security to all the mobile subscribers has become a major 
concern of mobile network operators. 
In spite the relative security guaranteed by the mobile operators and the advancements in 
technologies to protect the mobile phone users, attackers have competitively learned to exploit 
the vulnerabilities in existing mobile network communication to conduct illegitimate activities 
and gain control over personal information of mobile users. Repeated incidents of private calls, 
messages or pictures of government officials, celebrities and businessmen being leaked over 
the Internet have demonstrated concrete evidence about vulnerability of telecommunication 
systems. These incidents not only question the capability and responsibility of mobile 
operators, but also agitate common laymen about their personal privacy. While most attacks in 
the public eye have exploited weaknesses in the end-device software, less known attacks that 
exploit weaknesses of the mobile network have also become an everyday problem. This thesis 
focuses on such attacks against the mobile backbone and signaling systems. 
Most people consider a mobile telecommunication network as a complex system built with 
cutting edge technologies. This perception of people leads to a misconception about the security 
and privacy protection provided by these networks. Most people assume that attacks can be 
performed only by skillful hackers and sophisticated government intelligence agencies as the 
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attacks might be cumbersome and expensive to execute. The fact is that the mobile network is 
indeed quite a complicated system built with multiple subsystems, which in turn might have 
different underlying technologies. But the security of the whole network is determined by the 
security level of the weakest subsystem and many points of the modern networks are 
surprisingly open for professional or institutional attackers. 
1.1 Motivation 
In this era of mass surveillance and cyber espionage, numerous attacks are conducted by 
government agencies and evil hackers on mobile users. Recent report in the media revealed 
that one of the major government surveillance agencies is collecting bulk information from the 
mobile traffic [2]. Yet another leaked report [3] from Ukrainian communication regulators 
(NKRZ) and Ukrainian Security  Services (SBU) disclosed that suspicious mobile network 
packets from one of the telecommunication partners from Russia was revealing location of 
mobile users and there were high chances that their voice calls were being intercepted. 
Investigation of the above mentioned incidents by security experts unveiled the fact that those 
attacks have been carried out by misusing the technical features of a mobile core network 
technology known as Signaling System #7 (SS7) protocol. The researchers demonstrated that 
the SS7 network is vulnerable and the loopholes in SS7 protocol have been utilized for 
surveillance of mobile communication. 
SS7 protocol dates back to 1970s when it was used by a closed community of national 
telephone network operators and was built based on the trust between those operators. Today, 
SS7 is also used for interconnectivity between mobile network operator networks and to enable 
roaming and cellular services across operator domains. Since the access to the mobile core 
network was initially restricted only to the trusted telecom operators, SS7 was considered to be 
safe as the physical security of underlying network elements and communication channel was 
assured. Regardless of the advancement in IP-based mobile technologies, SS7 still continues 
to dominate the telecommunication world because it has become the backbone of Global 
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) systems and all new cellular technologies based 
on it. However, the mobile networks are no longer the realm of a few trusted national operators. 
Newer technologies like SIGTRAN and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) have increased the 
entry points to mobile core network and the opening of the telecommunications market for 
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competition has increased the number of “trusted” operators far beyond what was originally 
intended. 
In the last quarter of 2014, several successful attacks [4] using the SS7 network such as 
eavesdropping [5], tracking of user [6], SMS spoofing [7] and SMS redirect [8], have been  
demonstrated. However, an in-depth technical research of these attacks from the mobile 
network provider’s point of view to understand the vulnerabilities in the existing systems has 
been lacking. Single attacks have been publicized mainly for the purpose of marketing 
consultancy services, and there is no published analysis that would give an overall picture of 
the vulnerabilities. This knowledge gap has stood as hindrance to implement the necessary 
security measures. 
This thesis addresses the gap between attack discovery and the much needed security 
implementations from the network providers, by presenting a thorough analysis of attacks 
against SS7-based mobile network signaling and the possible mitigation strategies. The 
information in this thesis will help mobile network providers and mobile network operators to 
assess the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure and to make security-aware decisions regarding 
future investments. The analysis and new results of this thesis will, in particular, be used to 
support standardization of security features in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
arena. 
1.2 Goals 
The goal of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis of recent attacks on mobile 
network communication backend specifically targeting the Signaling System #7 (SS7) 
protocol. The thesis includes a thorough analysis of signaling-protocol vulnerabilities in the 
Network Switching Subsystem (NSS) i.e. mobile core network and roaming architecture of 
telecommunication backend. The background literature review explains the underlying 
signaling message details, flows and network entity descriptions.  
The primary goal is to conduct exhaustive research to analyze the recently published SS7 
attacks by elaborating the attack preparation phase and to increase our understanding of the 
various attack scenarios by inspecting the malicious message flows.  This perusal will lead to 
new information about the outcomes and impact of already known attacks; to potential 
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countermeasures and mitigation strategies; and finally to the discovery of new attacks. 
Furthermore, a secondary goal is to briefly consider how the transition to the newer IP-based 
Long-Term Evolution (LTE)/ Diameter protocol, which is expected to eventually replace SS7 
will affect mobile network security. 
1.3 Brief summary of results 
An in-depth inspection of the known attacks on the mobile communication backend was 
conducted, and the results of this investigation are thoroughly articulated in this thesis. The 
attacks are analyzed and explained in the context of the underlying signaling architecture and 
message flows. The attacks analyzed are categorized based on the possible impacts and the 
underlying modus operandi. Furthermore, some new attack vectors were discovered and 
documented. For reasons of responsible disclosure, only one of the two new attacks can be 
explained in this thesis. The results will be presented to the relevant equipment manufacturers 
and standards bodies, and the new attack in Chapter 5 has been submitted for publication. A 
brief outline of mitigation strategies and counter measures is also provided. 
1.4 Scope of the thesis and the author’s contribution 
The thesis work has been carried out at Nokia Networks Finland under the supervision of Dr. 
Silke Holtmanns and Dr. Ian Oliver of the Security Research team. The author has implemented 
most of the attacks surveyed in this thesis (in a protected test environment, to avoid attacking 
real world systems) and verified that the attacks actually work. The implementations confirm 
the feasibility of the attacks as described in chapter 4, and constituted a major part of the work 
in preparing this thesis. Due to company policies and reasons of responsible disclosure, some 
of the information related to analysis strategy, network traces, actual behaviors, success rates, 
and codes cannot be revealed in a public document such as this thesis. However, the included 
information should be sufficient to assure the readers that these are real security issues that also 
take place in deployed cellular networks. 
In the beginning of chapter 4, an executive summary of research methodology has been 
outlined. The work methods are typical of systems security research and of the type that is 
commonly used to contribute to security protocol standardization in the 3GPP arena. Thus, 
instead of writing the analysis methodologies from a security audit point of view, the workflow 
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of attacks has been outlined in detail with references to the relevant 3GPP specifications and 
references. This information is of the kind that is needed as background information for the 
standards body and operators to decide on the countermeasures that will be implemented. The 
Appendix provides further information to support some of the aspects mentioned as part of the 
attacks. 
Note that frequent use of the word 'analysis' in this thesis might mislead the reader to expect a 
mathematical model or network traces of verifications. We stress that in our context, analysis 
means reviewing, structuring, and analyzing the feasibility of the attacks, as is typical in 
security analysis in the systems security field. 
The main part of this thesis has been structured to fit "Review-type study" as mentioned in the 
official guidelines document of University of Tartu [9]- section 3.1.2. Sufficient references 
have also been given to the original ideas of different authors, which have been synthesized 
into one coherent picture. Currently there are no other public document available which provide 
a similar comprehensive summary of major core network attacks. So this thesis will be, to the 
knowledge of its author, the first of its kind.  
Additionally, the author has also found new attack vectors which has been described in chapter 
5. The discovery, thorough description and proof-of-concept implementation of new attacks, 
inspired by previous literature, is a typical working methods of the systems security area, which 
justifies the entitlement of the thesis to fit into the category of "Review-type study". In a broad 
sense, this part of the thesis also fits into the category ‘Solution of Application development 
task’, although the developed and implemented results of security research are often negative 
i.e. new attacks. 
1.5 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 2 provides the essential background regarding the mobile network core network 
signaling system and the SS7 protocol stack. An outline of the various core network entities 
and addressing schemes is given. 
Chapter 3 articulates various potential entry points of an attacker to the mobile core network. 
Additionally, this chapter highlights the current status of telecommunication security. 
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Chapter 4 explains the known attacks against mobile network that exploit SS7 features. The 
attacks and the exploited signaling features are presented in a uniform way. This chapter also 
classifies the core network attacks into categories such as location privacy breach, call 
interception and eavesdropping, and SMS based attacks. Each of these categories elucidates 
different attack methods. 
Chapter 5 illustrates one of the new attack vectors uncovered by the author during the thesis 
project. This chapter illustrates how an attacker can unblock stolen mobile phones without the 
mobile operator’s cooperation using a loophole in core network signaling. 
Chapter 6 proposes potential counter measures against the attacks that have been described in 
Chapter 4. 
The Chapter 7 contains a brief discussion of the newer technologies that will eventually replace 
SS7 and Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.  
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2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction to SS7 
Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) is one of the most widely used network architecture and a 
protocol used in telephony world.  It is also known by the name C7 outside North America. 
SS7 is standardized by International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication 
Standardization Sector (ITU-T). This standard articulates specific set of protocol about 
information exchange over a digital signaling network in the public switched telephone 
network (PSTN) systems.  SS7 is widely used in cellular (wireless) and fixed-line (wire line) 
for call establishment, billing, routing and information exchange. Alongside basic 
communication functionalities such as setting up and release the telephone calls, SS7 serves as 
a rich source of meta-data and serves various other purposes within the communications 
network. It has served its purpose over four decades and has been a substantial source of income 
for the service providers. Though it is not going to last in the industry for various outdated 
methods and security vulnerabilities, many aspects of SS7 will be replicated in the signaling 
networks. 
2.2 Application of SS7 
Being the backbone of Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), SS7 protocol suite has its 
diverse application across the global telecommunication network. It is the signaling protocol 
used between the control elements in the mobile core network. When a mobile is switched on, 
the identification, authentication and registration of the Subscriber Identity Module takes place 
through SS7 based signaling. SS7 is also needed each time we make a telephone call which 
goes beyond local exchange. Despite being used in daily routine for mobile telephony, many 
of the end users are unaware of its existence or diverse applications. 
Other than those mentioned above, here are the application of SS7 network and protocol: 
1. Call establishment, management and release. 
2. Short Message Service (SMS) 
3. Supplementary services by the mobile operators such as Call Number Display (CND), 
call waiting and call forwarding. 
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4. Line Information Database (LIDB) which has information related to subscriber's 
identification such as name and address along with billing information. 
5. Local Number Portability (LNP) 
6. Toll-free numbers for telemarketing 
7. Televoting 
8. Enhanced Messaging Services (EMS) such as logos and ringtone delivery. 
9. Call blocking (Do-not-call enforcement) 
 
Besides its applications in telecommunication networks, it also acts as a connection to the data 
communication world by providing features like Internet call-waiting, games based on 
locations, services which uses browser based telecommunication, Hotspot billing, etc. 
2.3 SS7 Network 
2.3.1 Signaling Network Architecture 
Definition of signaling according to ITU-T is as follows “The exchange of information (other 
than by speech) specifically concerned with the establishment, release and other control of 
calls, and network management, in automatic telecommunications operations” [10] . Users of 
PSTN hence exchange many such signals with network elements; the user dialing digits and 
sending a waiting or dial tone are some examples of it.  Telephony signaling can be classified 
into two categories namely ‘subscriber signaling’ and ‘network signaling’. 
As shown in Figure 2.1, subscriber signaling happens on the link between subscribers (end 
users) and the nearby local switch; whereas the signaling that takes place between the nodes of 
core network is known as network signaling. The latter means network signaling which takes 
place between source and destination local switch through the core network. Network signaling 
is complex compared to subscriber signaling as it supports various database-driven 
functionalities such as calling plan validation, Local Number Portability and roaming. Since 
the SS7 protocol stack comes under the network signaling, the rest of this thesis will consider 
only network signaling. 
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Figure 2.1: Categories of signaling. 
Implementation of network signaling is possible by two methods namely Channel Associated 
Signaling (CAS) and Common Channel Signaling (CCS). Predecessors of SS7 such as initial 
versions of Signaling System Number 6 (SS6) used CAS methods, however currently it is not 
widely deployed. In CAS systems, most of the signaling takes place in a deterministic manner.  
For example, a dedicated fixed signaling capacity is pre -allocated for every trunk in a fixed 
way. This approach was prone to attacks where the subscriber can make free phone calls 
illegally by generating line signals with the help of handheld tone generator placing it near the 
mouthpiece of the phone. Major disadvantage of CAS based systems is that signaling cannot 
be done in the in the call connection phase, which imposed limits on signaling states. Another 
drawback is that the resource allocation is inefficient because of its deterministic nature. 
On the other hand, the resource (signal) allocation in CSS happens in a need-based non-
deterministic way, which makes it more efficient than CAS. The signaling capacity here is 
provided in a common pool and it will be used where and when necessary. SS7 is a purely CCS 
based protocol and is packet based carrying 200 bytes of information in each SS7 packet. The 
advantage of being a packet based approach is that it can support two different ways of 
signaling: 
1. Circuit based signaling: This indicates the primary purpose of signaling such as set up, 
management and dropping telephone calls. 
2. Non-circuit based signaling: This type of signaling facilitates data transfer between 
network entities for purpose other than telephone calls. 
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Often, the telephone calls are referred to as voice and anything other than voice are referred as 
user traffic or signaling. Since SS7 is based on CCS, it indeed makes sense to know more about 
it. CCS supports three different types of signaling modes. Signaling mode refers to the type of 
relationship that the network traffic and signaling path holds. This matters to CCS mainly 
because of the reason that it is not a fixed path. So the efficiency and performance would matter 
on the relationship between the signaling modes. The brief description of signaling modes of 
CCS follows: 
1. Associated mode: There are fixed signaling paths between the switches. This mode is 
less complicated to design, but are less efficient and more expensive in a large network. 
The requirement of this mode is that the underlying network should have mesh topology 
connecting all nodes. 
 
As represented in Figure 2.2, the voice and the user traffic transmission happens in the same 
route. 
 
Figure 2.2: Associated Mode of Signaling. 
2. Non-associated mode: As the name indicates, there will not be any fixed paths for 
transmission which results in potentially multiple of paths during a voice call or other 
user traffic. There is no guarantee that voice and user traffic would reach to the 
destination at same time as they might take different paths and there is no specific 
method to re-order the out of sequence messages. This is the reason why non- associated 
mode is not used in SS7 protocol. 
 
3. Quasi -associated mode: This is more economical way compared to the associated mode 
mainly because there is no need of fully mesh topology in the underlying network as 
the signaling can be routed through intermediate nodes avoiding the direct links. It is 
designed in such a way that voice calls and user traffic arrive simultaneously as the path 
will be fixed at the beginning of a call based on the need. It differs from non-associated 
signaling mode by offering a relatively fixed path. 
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Figure 2.3: Quasi-associated mode of signaling. 
The advantage of CCS over CAS is that it provides more flexibility and control of signaling. It 
comparatively less expensive alongside facilitating efficient resource allocation and usage, 
resulting in faster call set up. It overcomes the security limitations of CAS as an end user cannot 
generate signals pertaining to the core network. 
2.3.2 Signaling Architecture 
When we have a deeper look into SS7 architecture, it uses bi-directional channels called 
signaling links where it transfers the messages. These signaling links connect the building 
blocks of the network known as signaling points. There are three signaling points namely 
Signal Switching Point (SSP), Signal Transfer Points (STP) and Signal Control Points (SCP). 
Each of these points is identified by a unique code, and that code will be carried in the signaling 
message between such the signaling points. This code identifies the source and destination. The 
signaling path for a message will be chosen by a point using a routing table. The Figure 2.4 
shows the visual representation of the SS7 signaling points in the architecture: 
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Figure 2.4: SS7 signaling points [11]. 
Brief descriptions of the signaling points are as follows: 
1. Signal Switching Point (SSP):  These are the telephone switches which initiate, switch 
or terminate calls. They communicate with other SSPs to establish, manage and release 
voice circuits. They are capable of communicating with SCP's database to check the 
routing information in case of a toll-free number. 
2. Signal Transfer Points (STP): These are the packet switches which perform routing of 
incoming signaling message from the source towards the destination based on the 
information contained in the SS7 message. 
3. Signal Control Points (SCP): These are nothing but databases which aid the services 
that are supplementary to normal calling. Usually SCPs are deployed in pairs with the 
STPs for reliability. 
In accordance with the usage in the network, the links between SS7 signaling points are 
logically divided into six types - “A” through “F”. Although all these links are either 56Kbps 
or 64 Kbps bidirectional data links supporting the lower layers of the protocol, they differ by 
their usage in connecting the signaling points. The Figure 2.6 below shows the different 
signaling link types: 
1. A Links: Access links (A link) interconnects the signaling points (either SSP or STP or 
SCP). This type of link is used to transmit the messages that are originated or destined 
to signaling end points. In Figure 2.6, examples of A link are 2-8, 5-12, etc. 
2. B Links: Bridge link (B link) interconnects one STP with another. When there are 
multiple networks, the primary STPs of these networks are connected in a quadrilateral 
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manner. The links in the Figure 2.6 such as 8-7, 7-11, 11- 12 and 12 -8 makes one such 
quad.  
3. C Links: A Cross link (C Link) interconnects STPs which are performing similar 
functions with their mated pair. Any message will be transmitted through this type of 
links only when a specific STP was no other routes to reach the destination such as in 
the case of link failures and thus enhances the reliability of the signaling network. The 
links 7-8 and 9-10 represents the C links. 
4. D Links: D link stands for 'Diagonal link' which interconnects primary STP pair (such 
as an inter-network gateway of the quad-linked STPs as explained before) to a local 
STP pair. This can be used at different hierarchical levels. 8-9 and 7-10 are examples 
of D link. 
5. E Links: An 'extended link' (E link) connects an SSP to an alternate STP which serves 
as a  substitute signaling path when the main or home STP cannot be reached. Simply 
put, messages will be transmitted from the SSPs to STPs when the A link is not 
functioning. This kind of links will be deployed only when it makes a marginal 
difference to the reliability matrix of the network. In the Figure 2.6, 1-11 and 1-12 
represents E links. 
6. F Links: F link stands for 'Fully associated link'.  They connect two signaling end points 
that are not traditionally included in the network with STPs. As shown in the Figure 
2.6, link 1-2 is an F -link. These kind of links are generally not deployed between two 
networks as they bypass the security measures provided by STPs. 
The difference between B and D link is negligible or rather arbitrary and for this reason, those 
links are termed as 'B/D links'. As we can infer, the difference between all the types is just at a 
logical level and irrespective of their name, these signaling links carry messages within the SS7 
network. 
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Figure 2.5: SS7 signaling links [12]. 
2.4 SS7 Protocol Stack 
The hardware and software functionality of the SS7 protocol are divided into functional 
abstractions called layers. A comparison of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference 
model along with SS7 protocol stack in given in the Figure 2.7. 
Message Transfer Part (MTP): 
This is divided into three levels – MTP level 1, MTP level 2 and MTP level 3. MTP level 1 
being the lowest layer, works similar to that of the physical layer of OSI model as it defines the 
physical and electrical characteristics of a signaling link. MTP level 2 functions as the data link 
layer by facilitating flow control, sequence validation and error checking. This layer guarantees 
the accuracy of message transmission between two signaling points. Similar to that of network 
layer in OSI model, the MTP level 3 extends the functionality of MTP level 2 with its 
capabilities such as routing, congestion control and node addressing. When there is a link 
failure, this level re-routes the network traffic away from the failed parts of the network. 
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Figure 2.6: SS7 Protocol Stack [13]. 
Signaling Connection Control Part (SCCP) 
SCCP facilitates functionalities such as Global Title Translation (GTT) and network services. 
Together with TCAP, this layer acts equivalent to that of transport layer of the OSI model. 
Further details about the functionality of SCCP will appear in the upcoming chapters. 
Telephone User Part (TUP) 
In most countries, this level is replaced by ISDN, but it can still be seen in countries like China 
and Brazil. It supports the basic call establishment and release. This deals only with the analog 
circuits. 
Transaction Capabilities Application Part (TCAP) 
This layer contains the messages and protocols that serves as the communication between 
applications within the signaling points. This is mainly used in those services which need 
database support such as Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) and toll-free numbers. To be 
more specific, the messages such as queries and responses which are exchanged between SSP 
and SCP are carried through TCAP messages. This layer also takes care of equipment 
identification and roaming in mobile networks. 
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ISDN User Part (ISUP) 
This layer defines the protocol for voice trunk call establishment, management and termination 
in which they carry voice and data between the calling and called party. The only calls which 
do not use ISUP protocol are the calls that originate and terminate in at the same switch. 
Contrary to the name, along with ISDN calls, ISUP will also be used for non-ISDN based calls 
over a Public Switched Network. 
Message Application Part (MAP) 
Message Application Protocol (MAP) is one of the applications of the SS7 protocol stack which 
provides all the additional signaling functionality of the core network. It is responsible for 
mobility management and such additional services required by mobile networks. MAP is used 
between many elements of the core network; Home Location Register (HLR), Equipment 
Identity Register (EIR), Mobile Switching Center (MSC) and Visitor Location Register (VLR), 
and others. With the release of latest 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) specifications, 
MAP supports 81 services [14], which can be categorized as mobility management, operations 
and maintenance, call handling, short message services, supplementary services, location 
services, and Protocol Data Packet (PDP) context services. Among the network elements that 
MAP protocol uses, HLR and MSC are the most important components. These take 
dynamically the role of MAP-service user or MAP-service provider in the MAP service model. 
The network elements of the core network are addressed by MAP using Sub System Numbers 
(SSN) and Global Title (GT) provided by Signaling Connection Control Part (SCCP) of SS7. 
As MAP uses the SS7 stack with the help of the Message Transfer Part (MTP), SCCP and 
Transaction Capabilities Application Part (TCAP) layers, it also facilitates inter-MSC 
handovers during a call. Alongside subscriber and location management, it is also responsible 
for mobile terminal validation, fault recovery, and authentication and security. It does not 
handle the cell level handovers but manages any handovers above that. 
2.5 Overview of core network entities 
Section 2.3 of this chapter provides a logical abstraction of the core network in terms of SSPs, 
STPs and SCPs. However, the practical implementations of those abstracts are in terms of 
various network elements. This section gives a brief outline of the overall mobile telephony 
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network, emphasizing the functionality of the major core network elements. Figure 2.8 outlines 
the architecture of core network including the Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN) 
and the Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN) core network. 
 
Figure 2.7: Overview of mobile network architecture. 
 
The HPLMN is the mobile network to which the mobile users has subscribed. Any network 
other than HPLMN is considered to be VPLMN. When the mobile users roaming in VPLMN, 
that network will receive subscription information (such as billing, profile, identities) from the 
HPLMN.  MSC and VLR are typically collocated in each network and will be considered as 
one unit. The HLR contains the subscriber and service information. EIR is the entity that 
provides verifies whether a mobile device has been reported as stolen or missing. The EIR 
stores the list of stolen or missing devices which is queried by HLR. Since the scope of this 
thesis is limited to the core network, details regarding the Radio Access Network (RAN) are 
omitted. 
As said, the Home Location Register (HLR) is a centralized database which stores subscription 
related data [15] and service data. It also stores global titles and routing information (e.g. 
Access Point Name). Subscriber information such as location details is retrievable using the 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card 
or the USIM application on a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC). Likewise, service 
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information such as the operator specific services to which the subscriber has subscribed to are 
stored in the HLR. An internal mapping is maintained by HLR between IMSI and MSISDN. 
Network entities like MSC and VLR uses the SS7 MAP protocol to interact with the HLR. The 
HLR is queried for various purposes such as location updates, routing and authentication. To 
limit the load on the HLR, the network operator might configure the number of checks 
regarding subscribers. An adequate level of such checks must be maintained, however, because 
decrease in such checks increases the risk of unauthorized access to network facilities (e.g. 
using an invalid SIM). 
MSC works as an entry point to core network from the Radio Access Network (RAN). It 
bridges the Base Station Subsystems (BSS) and core network elements such as HLR using the 
SS7 MAP protocol [16]. It handles also other operations like managing the interfaces and 
billing and call processing. It is often collocated with the VLR. 
As mentioned, EIR provides features to tackle mobile thefts by preventing stolen or banned 
mobile equipment from accessing the network [14]. This is facilitated by checking the 
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), which is provisioned during mobile 
manufacturing, against black, white or grey listed sets from the EIR database. The data is 
retrieved using the mobile device specific IMEI as a key, which is independent of the IMSI, 
MSISDN or SIM/UICC card identifier ICC_ID [14]. 
Furthermore, the Short Message Service Center (SMSC) is the core network element 
responsible for storing and forwarding short messages [17]. Billing center (not shown in the 
Figure 2.8), which includes gsmSCF, gsmSSF, etc. is responsible for subscriber billing for their 
calls, SMS and any other value added services. The Authentication center (AuC) is yet another 
network entity which is responsible for authenticating the subscriber SIM or USIM before 
allowing the use equipment to connect to cellular services. However, a detailed description of 
AuC is omitted here because, within the core network, the traffic will be un-encrypted and AuC 
does not play a major role. 
2.6 Identifiers and Addressing Schemes 
The diverse range of subsystem within mobile network use several different identifiers and 
addressing schemes to uniquely identify the network elements, applications and subscribers. 
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The Figure 2.9 illustrates the identifiers and addressing schemes used at some of the key layers 
of the SS7 protocol stack. 
 
Figure 2.8: Identifiers and identifiers used at different layers of SS7 [18]. 
The purpose of the IMEI [19] is to identify each individual mobile device. IMEI is a unique 
number to identify mobile phones and satellite phones over the GSM, Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) and Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks [20]. The 
IMEI consists usually of a 15 digit unique number often complemented by a check digit which 
is excluded as part of the IMEI check transmission [19]. The IMEI can be up to 17 digits long 
as some manufactures add a two-digit software version of the device. All mobile manufacturers 
are mandated to equip any mobile device with an IMEI number and strict measures are taken 
to make it tamper proof by physical, electrical or software methods. Such genuine IMEI 
numbers holds all the required information for the network operators to trace a mobile device’s 
origin of production uniquely with the help of EIR when it is required. 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) on the other hand uniquely identifies the 
cellular network subscription and is used by the core network for identifying the mobile’s home 
network and HLR. It is used for obtaining information on network service usage by the 
subscriber [19]. The IMSI is up to 15 digits long but it can be shorter than that depending on 
the network operator. The first three digits of IMSI are the Mobile Country Code (MCC), the 
next two are Mobile Network Code (MNC), which identify uniquely the home operator of the 
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subscriber, and the following ten digits are the Mobile Subscription Identification Number 
(MSIN) within the scope of that operator. [21] 
 To avoid extensive use of IMSI and hence to protect subscriber privacy, a temporary 
substitution of IMSI called the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) is used in 
mobility signaling. Since TMSIs have just the local significance, it is stored in the MSC/VLR 
only. Unlike IMSIs, the TMSIs are not stored in HLR. 
Mobile Subscriber ISDN number (MSISDN) is simply the phone number of each subscription 
of the mobile users. It contains a 3 digit Country Code (CC), 2-3 digits National Destination 
Code (NDC) and a 10 digit Subscriber Number (SN). However, when the user is in roaming 
(or in VPLMN), the mobile station is recognized by a provisional location dependent ISDN 
number known as Mobile Station Roaming Number (MSRN). It has the similar format of 
MSISDN, but all the codes refer to the visited network rather than home network. This number 
will be used for connecting voice calls to the mobile device in its current location. 
Subsystem Number (SSN) [21] is used in the SCCP signaling part to uniquely identify the 
applications within the core network. Global Title (GT), which we have already referred to, is 
yet another addressing scheme used in the SCCP protocol [22] for uniquely identifying the 
network elements for routing purposes. GT can range up to 15 digits. In layman’s terms, SSN 
is equivalent to a TCP ports whereas GT is equivalent to an IP address. 
Point Code (PC), on the other hand, is a 14 or 24-digit address similar to a MAC address, used 
to uniquely identify signaling point nodes in the MTP3 layer in the destination field of Message 
Signaling Unit (MSU). The three types of point codes according to ITU-T Q.704 standards are 
the Originating Point Code (OPC), Destination Point Code (DPC) and International Signaling 
Point Code (ISPC). 
Routing of signaling messages within the core network is based on the combination of PC, GT 
and SSN addressing schemes. IMSI and IMEI are used to identify the subscriber’s profiles and 
mobile terminals. 
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3 SS7 ATTACK SCENARIO 
In this chapter, we discuss how an attacker can gain access to the SS7 mobile core network 
with the help of different entry points. Also it gives a brief outline of the attacks that will be 
discussed in the rest of this thesis. 
3.1 Overview of entry points to core network 
The number and complexity of interfaces between heterogeneous network entities pose major 
vulnerabilities to the SS7 mobile core network. Additionally, expanding interdependence and 
interconnectivity between the telecommunication networks and Internet has elevated the 
threats. The vulnerabilities in Internet and mobile networks affect each other. However, the key 
loophole of the SS7 backbone system lies in the lack of authentication procedures, as SS7 was 
intended for closed telecommunication coteries. 
Changes in the regulation and opening of the telephony industry to competition has given rise 
to easier ways to get into the mobile core network. For example, the United States 
“Telecommunications Act of 1996” [23] enforces laws to “let anyone enter any communication 
business – to let any communication business to enter any market against any other” [24]. It 
also mandates the implementation of Legal Interception Gateways (LIGs) [25] which allows 
government agencies to lawfully intercept mobile communication. The “Telecommunications 
Act of 1996” allowed the small scale Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) to 
introduce new trends in telecommunication industry by breaking the monopoly business of 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs). ILECs have a large scale establishment and 
hence expertise along with measures to address the security needs. CLECs, on the other hand, 
being relatively small companies and new entrants to the market, may be more insecure because 
of the budget constraints and need to compete by cutting costs. Any of the CLECs, including 
ones established by malicious attackers, can gain access to the SS7 core network at a reasonably 
low cost [23]. Since STPs and SCPs have human facing frontend systems, an attacker can 
compromise them in a CLEC environment and thus gain control over the core networks. 
Another potential threat to the closed backend core network comes from the relatively 
inexpensive ISDN connection. By injecting malicious ISDN (ISUP) messages, an attacker can 
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connect to SSPs, which bridges end users to SS7 entry points and hence enter the core network. 
The attacker can also execute Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks by overloading the 
SSP entities beyond its capabilities and harm interconnection between SSPs and STPS [13].  
Yet another threat of attacker gaining access to the core network comes from Local Number 
Portability (LNP) [26]. The Application Programming Interface (APIs) to SCPs to incorporate 
LNP has been exploited by the attackers to gain knowledge of secret subscriber information 
and mobile user location. A compromised femtocell (a small, low-power cellular base station 
typically used for small business) and GSM-only phones which downgrade the higher cellular 
specification (such as 3G and 4G) to 2G, can act as a hot hub for attackers to exploit SS7 
vulnerabilities. Value added services such as Unstructured Supplementary Service Data 
(USSD), SMS, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
have given rise to more advanced attacks against the SS7 network elements. The Figure 3.1 
diagrammatically summarizes the entry points to the SS7 network through the various network 
elements mentioned in section 2.5. 
 
Figure 3.1: Possible entry points to mobile communication network backend [27]. 
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3.2 Mapping the SS7 periphery 
Attackers extensively use the SIGTRAN protocol [28], an extension to the SS7 family, to 
exploit the vulnerable entry point (port) and hence map the GSM core network. By this, the 
attacker not only gains knowledge about the underlying infrastructure but also learns network 
internal aspects such as Global Title and Point Codes, which he can use for his attacks further.  
Being an addendum of SS7 suite, SIGTRAN supports call management and application 
exemplars of SS7 but over the Internet Protocol (IP) and the transport-layer called Stream 
Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [29]. SIGTRAN facilitates adaptation of Voice over IP 
(VoIP) networks to the PSTN signaling. An attacker can use SCTP stealth scanning 
methodologies [27] to explore the vulnerable ports in the SS7 core network. 
One of the useful tools to scan SCTP-enabled network elements is SCTPScan [30] which scans 
machines having major operating systems such as Linux, BSD, MacOS X and Solaris. It allows 
the attacker to find entry points to the telecom core network infrastructure along with mapping 
them. 
SCTPScan uses the INIT (Initiation) chunk of SCTP packet and listen to the INIT ACK 
message to learn the live host machines and open ports. Figure 3.2 represents the SCTP 
message format and the different types of chunks that form the message payload. 
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Figure 3.2: (a) SCTP Packet format [31] (b) SCTP chunk types. 
The SCTPscan tool does not perform a full 4-way SCTP handshake because, it might establish 
a real connection to target machine along with slowing down the scan process. Instead it lets 
the attacker to send repeated INIT messages specific to each port to the network element 
(server) and waits for a response. If the port is closed, the server responds with the ABORT 
message. But, if the port is open, the server responds with the INIT ACK message which 
informs the attacker that the SCTP port is open. The Figure 3.3 below demonstrates the basic 
SCTP 4-4-way handshake and the stealth scan. 
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Figure 3.3: (a) SCTP full 4 way handshake (b) SCTP stelath scan by attacker [27]. 
By doing the SCTP scanning, attacker not only gains entry to the SS7 core network (STPs) but 
also he can perform the following tasks thereafter: 
1. He can intercept the traffic routing through STPs and learn Destination Point 
Codes (DPC) to penetrate deeper into to the network stack. 
2. For each DPC learnt, the attacker can perform an SSN scan which allows him 
to know the applications or services (e.g. call services, SMS services) running 
on the underlying network elements. Depending on the service that is running 
the network element, the attacker can classify the network elements into SMSC, 
HLR, etc. 
3. Once the type of the network element is known, the attacker can perform 
application or service level scan tests (MAP tests, CAP tests, etc.) to further dig 
into the network stack. 
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3.3 Current status of SS7 vulnerabilities 
As mentioned in section 3.1, the vulnerabilities of SS7 telecommunication backbone network 
would affect the vulnerabilities of the Internet and vice versa. Besides, the attacks of 2G (GSM) 
SS7 protocol can be extended to higher standards such as 3G and 4G. Enhanced services such 
as SIP, VoIP and GPRS increase the entry points to the core network and allow malicious 
hackers to exploit further vulnerabilities of the legacy network backend. Since backward 
compatibility needs to be maintained within the telecommunication world, a downgrading 
attack is potentially possible from 4G, 3G to 2G. Figure 3.4 below summaries the number of 
vulnerabilities found, grouped according to the various network elements. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Number of vulnerabilities (on Y-axis) based on different network elements (X-axis) [32]. 
Network elements such as BSC and BTS are part of RAN, whereas HSS and Node B are 
specific to 3G and 4G networks. Though the attacks surveyed in this thesis apply to 3G and 4G 
elements on a generic level, the focus of this thesis is on the SS7 backbone, with most modern 
mobile networks are still compatible. 
It is clear from Figure 3.4 that the vulnerabilities associated with HLR is exploited on a larger 
scale mainly because HLR is the central element of the mobile core network hierarchy and 
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stores a lot of sensitive information. On the other hand MSC is equally exposed as it is the 
gateway to the core network from the RAN. The high number of attacks on STP infers that the 
attackers have penetrated the routing mechanism within the telephony backend. 
The Figure 3.5 demonstrates the number of vulnerabilities found so far [33] by different 
underlying protocols of the SS7 stack. 
 
Figure 3.5: Number of vulnerabilities by internal protocols. 
In comparison with the Diameter protocol [34], the number of vulnerabilities found in SS7 is 
higher. But this is mainly because of an exposure bias in the sense that the old protocol's (SS7) 
vulnerabilities are better known than those of the newer protocol deployments. The number of 
vulnerabilities specific to MAP protocol is explained by the fact that, MAP being an application 
layer protocol, provides diverse entry points to access core network internal elements such as 
HLR, VLR, MSC, EIR, SMSC, etc. The high rate of DDoS attacks and other forms of 
telecommunication network penetration attacks is evident from the higher number of SCCP 
vulnerabilities as SCCP is responsible for routing, flow control and error correction within SS7 
networks. 
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4 ANALYSIS OF ATTACKS 
4.1 Analysis paradigm 
Telecommunication networks support diverse range of services and entities which are 
connected using various protocol stacks. Attackers take advantage of diversity of such systems 
to perforate into the system. They use interconnection between protocols (such IP and SCTP) 
to gain access to the core network entities and go up the protocol stack to unveil different kinds 
of information (as mentioned in section 3.2). Any device in an IP network is recognized by IP 
and MAC addresses. Protocols such as TCP, UDP and SCTP offer ports to establish connection 
within the network hosts. The routing criteria will be based IP addresses. However, in mobile 
communication systems a diverse profusion of identifiers and addressing schemes (Figure 2.8) 
are used to identify network hosts, applications or even the subscribers. SS7 networks use 
combination of PC, GT or SSN for routing purposes. Analysis from an attacker’s point of view 
(‘what has to be done to perform a core network attack) is narrated below. 
Elements in the core network are connected with each other using SCTP.  However, SCTP 
ports are open to interact with Internet, which actually is the entry point to SS7 stack from IP 
network. So the attacker who already gained access to the SS7 network can use SCTP sockets 
to bind to the internal elements using IP stack. Using SCTP client-server applications, the 
attacker can establish connection with loosely secured network internal elements. One such 
basic example of client-server connection establishment is presented in Appendix A. While the 
connection is being established, the attacker can use standard packet monitoring tools such as 
Wireshark [35] (or tShark) to intercept the traffic. An example of such a traffic intercepted 
during SMS protocol is also presented in Appendix A. During these interceptions, attacker can 
learn more information about end points (such as network elements including GT, SSN) which 
helps him to impersonate as internal network elements and mimic the similar traffic during his 
attacks. 
Whilst intercepting the traffic, attacker can manipulate the message packets with false data 
using packet manipulation programs such as Scapy [36]. The attacker can use such tools to 
fake the message packets along with capturing them. These tools are also capable of creating 
invalid packet data, scanning, probing or trace routing. A sample of Scapy program to send 
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manipulated SCTP message is given in Appendix B. It gives attacker the privilege to 
manipulate each fields of network messages of many standard protocols, along with decode the 
packets, and match requests and replies. It helps him to inject false IMSIs, GTs of MSCs, etc. 
into normal messages interchanged between network elements.  
Though the previous two paragraphs explain how to perform attacks, from security audit point 
of view, analysis of attacks would be reviewing, structuring and analyzing the feasibility of the 
attacks. However, from the perspective of security audits, detecting the core network attacks 
are quite challenging as most of the attacks (frauds) takes place in stealth more. But the impact 
of such undetected attacks cause frightful financial loss to network vendors. Since 
telecommunication domain is huge, some of the common mistakes like IP overlaps, 
misconfiguration of firewalls or any other system configuration has to be audited by vendors. 
Lack of threat intelligence and mindset of telecommunication engineers are not yet open to 
adapt aggressive security skillset like that of IP-oriented engineers. 
One of the analysis techniques that was adapted by many network providers in cooperation 
with network operators is by honeypot trapping by setting up a purposeful trap. As a preparation 
of such analysis, overall data about messages being exchanged within the network has to be 
gathered. Analyzing such data would be helpful to find trace fingerprints of attackers. 
Examples of such fingerprints would be same end node trying to use similar false messages 
(this indicates that the attacker is using a single resource, or stack on same system). 
Furthermore, error log information would also hint attackers trying to exploit specific protocol 
or specific network resource. Once such anomalies are detected on purpose they will be fed to 
the honeypot trap. Being a subdomain of actual working network, the attackers will be trapped 
without their notice. Now the behavior of such attackers (at this point, it would be some 
suspicious end nodes) can be studied in detail. Key aspects of such behavior analysis is 
observing each and every activity of attackers including the resources they are trying to exploit, 
messages being sent, data which are faked, etc. Based on understanding the purpose of their 
activities, their requests can be fulfilled or rejected by the honeypot administrator. The 
interesting fact about most of the standard protocol is usually they are two way 
communications. So if the attacker can request something using two way protocols, the 
honeypot administrator or auditor can also request some kind of information to respond to 
attacker’s messages. The security auditor can also provide response claiming he is responding 
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to the attacker genuinely, but divert the attack traffic to a trap node. This allows to understand 
purpose and end-to-end communication of an attacker as each and every information is being 
monitored in honeypot environments. In case the system cannot respond (fulfil the attackers 
need), from the analysis the attacking nodes can be blacklisted. 
Based on auditing core network attacks on protected test environments, detailed workflow of 
attacks with relevant 3GPP specifications and references specific to exploited signaling 
features are articulated in this chapter in a uniform way. 
4.2 Location privacy breach 
With growing number of mobile phone users, number of services that the mobile user demands 
is increasing. There exists many location based services in which user allows the application 
vendors to learn about their location. However, the insufficiently protected nodes in mobile 
communication networks would also disclose the location without user's consent.  
Mobile phones have become a major part of our daily lives and hence a vital component of our 
communication and commutation. Since we carry our mobile phones almost everywhere and 
any time [37], the location information that can be learnt poses as one of the biggest privacy 
threats. Government agencies, hackers and advertisement companies spying on mobile end 
users without their knowledge or the awareness and consent of network operators are a serious 
issue in context of personal privacy. In this chapter we discuss the known weaknesses in mobile 
communication backend networks that would disclose location of a user and also outline the 
common mitigation approaches. 
In spite the advancement in mobile communication technology and the security of the air 
interface, there are very few measures taken to protect location privacy of the users from 
illegitimate access using the interworking network (i.e. SS7 / SIGTRAN). Location and 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) are co-related and they are protected from 
outer world as far as technically feasible. Using IMSI catchers the active attackers can collect 
IMSIs on Radio Access Network (RAN) or air interface. Besides, home network operator can 
fully track the user location whereas the visited network operator can partially track user 
location.    
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4.2.1 Regular Location Disclosure scenarios 
Network that the user has currently logged into would know the geo- location of the cell tower 
and this location information provides an approximate location of user to an attacker.  
Otherwise, this information is revealed to outer world in two cases as below: 
1.  “Locate my phone” services –Most often scenario of this use case is when the phone 
is lost, network operators would provide this information with consent of phone owner. 
2.  “Law enforcement” – In case of emergencies or when the user has to be tracked down 
for legal purposes. 
 
As part of law enforcement for Location Services (LCS), “Phase II E911 rules re-quire wireless 
service providers to provide more precise location information to PSAPs; specifically, the 
latitude and longitude of the caller. This information must be accurate to within 50 to 300 
meters depending upon the type of location technology used.” Though it is used for emergency 
purposes, it mandates the network operators to provide accurate position of the mobile. Unlike 
the normal location updates during calls or SMS, more precise location information is obtained 
using Radio Resource LCS Protocol (RRLP) [38] with the help of Gateway Mobile Location 
Centre (GMLC). 
4.2.2 Overview of Location Proximity 
To serve cellular services to appropriate mobile users, mobile networks have a specific 
geographic hierarchical structure. Such a structure for GSM consists of cell, Location Area, 
MSC service area, Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) service area and GSM Service area 
[39]. A pictorial representation of these geographic hierarchical structures is shown in Figure 
4.1: 
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Figure 4.1: GSM geographic hierarchy structure. 
Cell being the smallest area of GSM location hierarchy, it ranges from 100 meters to 35 
Kilometers (which is the radio coverage of a transmitter). Each cell is identified by Cell Global 
Identity and it is used for positioning. CGI is mapped to geographic co-ordinates by the 
operators using a pre-defined cell ID database. 
Multiples of such cells constitute a Location Area (LA). Every time a mobile user moves to a 
new LA, it will be updated in the VLR database. An MSC Service Area comprises of many 
such location areas that the MSC can serve. HLR stores the in-formation about MSC that serves 
a particular mobile station. MSCs are recognized by Global Title (GT). The whole area a 
mobile operator covers is identified as PLMN service area and each such area will have many 
MSCs serving that particular operator network. Overall area with GSM connectivity is 
considered as GSM Service area. Every network providers have similar structure and this 
logical mapping can often cross each other. 
4.2.3 Location disclosure using call setup messages 
As part of mobility management, the network operators have to keep track of the MS locations, 
while it is moving. The location information is often tracked using International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) which is attached to the network using IMSI Attach GSM procedure 
when a mobile phone is switched on. This is required by the MSC and VLR to keep the MS 
registered in the network for location updates. Once the mobile is turned on and ready to make 
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or receive messages/calls (the “idle” state), every time it moves to a new VLR/MSC area the 
location has to be updated in GSM system. The general network message flow [14] in those 
cases is as follows: 
1. When user places a call using phone number/ MSISDN of another user, an ISUP IAM 
(Initial Address Message) message which contains the MSISDN is generated. Based on 
the information contained in MSISDN, the call will be routed in the mobile network 
through GMSC. 
2. GMSC identifies the HLR location based on MSISDN and to locate the called MS, it 
dispatches the MAP Send Routing Information (MAP SRI) towards the HLR.  
3. HLR queries the VLR using MAP Provide Roaming Number message (MAP PRN) to 
get Mobile Station Roaming Number (MSRN). 
4. VLR responds to HLR with MAP PRN ack message which contains the MSRN, a 
temporary number assigned by the VLR which in turn contains the IMSI. 
5. HLR passes the MSRN back to GSMC with MAP Routing Information Acknowledge 
message. Now the Now the GSMC knows MSC and hence the location of the MS which 
is served by it. GSMC generates the IAM with MSRN of the called user. Since MSC 
can map MSRN to IMSI, on arrival of IAM message, it establishes the call connection. 
4.2.3.1 Attack using call setup messages 
This attack using the normal working message flow of the call set up messages to know the 
approximate location of the user (or MS). Successful completion of this attack as per [6] would 
reveal the IMSI (which is supposed to be a secret), global title of the MSC (which identifies 
the MSC uniquely in the global network and its geo-location) and error messages if the phone 
is turned off. The Figure 4.2 describes the attack in context. 
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Figure 4.2: Location disclosure using call setup messages. 
Here the attacker initiates the call set up IAM messages impersonating as GMSC. The attack 
message flow is as follows: 
1. Attacker with SS7 access impersonates as GMSC and initiates the call set up IAM 
message. 
2. He sends MAP SRI message enclosing the MSISDN (phone number) to the HLR. Since 
there is no authentication check made, HLR thinks someone is trying to call to the 
provided MSISDN and processes the message. 
3. HLR sends MAP Provide Roaming Number to the corresponding VLR to get the 
MSRN. 
4. The VLR responds with MAP Provide Roaming Number ACK containing the MSRN, 
which in turn contains the IMSI and Global Title (GT) of the MSC/VLR which is 
serving the MS enquired by the attacker. 
5. On arrival of MAP Provide Roaming Number ACK message, HLR will remit this 
information to the attacker impersonating as GMSC with MAP_SRI_ACK message. 
6. Attacker would not proceed to initiate the call set up as he has gained the information 
about user’s IMSI and MSC location. 
 
  35 
 
Numbering the MSCs with GT is purely operator specific, though it would reveal the location 
of mobile user. GT reveals the country (country code field of GT), area (area code) and possibly 
the network (if mobile networks in a country can be identified by area code). The location 
details can be further narrowed down by mapping MSC and its approximate geological 
location, by querying a large set of phone numbers with known location to the network. Since 
the number of phones that an MSC can serve is limited, the number of MSCs is more in a 
largely populated area compared to a single MSC serving a larger area in villages. So if the 
victim is in the city area, there are high chances that the attacker can know his exact location. 
4.2.4 Location disclosure using SMS protocol messages 
Short Message Service (SMS) is transmission of messages up to 140 bytes between mobile 
stations in a sore and forward mechanism. End to end SMS procedure comprises of two parts 
– first where the SMS is submitted to Short Message Service Center (SMSC) by the sender; 
second is the delivery of that message to the recipient from SMSC. Such short messages use 
signaling channels to accommodate simultaneous voice service over the mobile network [40]. 
Mobile stations transmit SMS over air interface to the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) and 
from which it enters the SS7 core network routing over MSC/VLR, SMSC and HLR towards 
the destination. 
Basic message workflow in SMS protocol as per [41] is as follows: 
1. Message submission by the sender (Mobile Originating part) 
─ The address of SMSC is usually stored in the SIM card. 
─ When the sender sends a Short Message (SM), the message along with SMSC 
address will be transmitted to the MSC. 
─ Based on the SMSC address specified, MSC imparts Mobile Originated 
ForwardSM (MO ForwardSM) message to the SMSC. 
─ If the SM is successfully delivered (stored in SMSC), it is acknowledged by 
SMS submit report message i.e. MO ForwardSM ACK. 
2. Message delivery by SMSC to the destination ( Mobile terminating part) 
─ To deliver SM to the destination, SMSC has to know the MSC location and 
IMSI of the recipient which is stored in the HLR. 
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─ SMSC sends MAP Send Routing Info For SM message to the HLR to query the 
MSC GT/location and IMSI of the recipient. 
─ HLR encapsulates IMSI and MSC location in MAP Send Routing Info For SM 
ACK message and sends it back to the SMSC. Based on this information, SMSC 
routes the SM to the recipient MSC which in turns delivers it to the mobile user. 
4.2.4.1 Attack using SMS protocol messages 
Here the attacker impersonates as SMSC and sends messages to know the MSC GT and IMSI 
of the victim. The Figure 4.3 describes the attack [6] message flow. 
Here the attacker performs following tasks: 
1. Attacker impersonates as SMSC and sends MAP Send Routing Info For SM message to 
the HLR by enclosing the MSISDN (phone number) of victim. 
2. The HLR thinks that the SMSC needs to send an SM to the provided MSISDN, and 
replies back with MAP Send Routing Info For SM ACK message which contains IMSI 
of the victim along with GT of the MSC that is serving the victim at that point. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Location disclosure using SMS protocol messages. 
  37 
 
Though MSC GT reveals the approximate location area of the victim, as explained earlier cell 
level geo-location mapping can be done with predefined set of MSC-Geolocation pairs. 
4.2.5 Location disclosure using CAMEL Location Management Function 
Messages 
Customized Applications for Mobile Networks Enhanced Logic (CAMEL) [42] is an overlay 
on MAP logical layer. As part of location management function, the net-work providers can 
send Any Time Interrogate (ATI) messages to the HLR from CAMEL platforms to obtain the 
cell ID or location of the user along with which it can provide the subscriber information such 
as billing data and International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI). The location 
information provided here is the last known location of the mobile user. Basic message flow of 
location management functions is described [43] as below: 
1. GSM Service control Function (gsmSCF) element will initiate the anyTimeInterro-
gation Request message by encapsulating the MSISDN and transmitting to the HLR of 
home network. 
2. Based on the provided MSISDN, the HLR will transmit the Provide SubscriberInfo 
message to the MSC/VLR. 
3. MSC sends a Paging Request message to the mobile station to look up its current state. 
If the mobile user is on call, then the age field is set to 0, as the MSC always knows the 
location. If the mobile user is not on call (which means age field is not 0), MSC would 
at least know the last location to where it served the MS. The Paging Response message 
will have cell ID and age information. 
4. On arrival of Paging Response, MSC responds to the HLR by sending Provide 
SubscriberInfo Response message which contains the cell ID, IMSI and/or IMEI of the 
requested MSISDN. 
5. HLR will now send the anyTimeInterrogation response back to the gsmSCF with the 
subscriber information from previous step. 
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4.2.5.1 Attack using anyTimeInterogation messages 
Here the attacker with SS7 access will impersonate as gsmSCF and sends the any-
TimeInterrogation Request message with the MSISDN of victim to HLR. The message flow 
of this attack [44] is as shown in the Figure 4.4. 
1. Attacker impersonates as gsmSCF and sends anyTimeInterrogation request message 
along with the MSISDN of the victim to HLR. 
2. HLR treats this as a legitimate message from gsmSCF and initiates the Provide 
SubscriberInfo request to the MSC/VLR. 
3. VLR initiates the Paging request to the MS and in return as part of Paging Response 
message receives the IMSI and location of the MS. 
4. MSC then sends the information from previous step along with MSC GT to the HLR 
via Provide SubscriberInfo Response. 
5. HLR forwards this information to the attacker via anyTimeInterrogation response 
message. 
 
Figure 4.4: Location disclosure using anytimeInterrogation messages. 
Attacker now knows the approximate cell of the victim along with IMSI, GT of the serving 
MSC and possibly the IMEI number. Here the attacker would know victim’s location more 
accurately as he can gain knowledge about the cell rather than just MSC as in the previously 
described attacks. 
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4.2.5.2 Hybrid Attack using SMS and CAMEL messages 
Though anyTimeInterrogation is part of some of the location finder application services [39], 
many network operators block (filter) it for security purposes and hence attacker might not get 
anyTimeInterrogation request message in return always. However, we can bypass that using a 
hybrid attack [44] by directly querying the MSC/VLR. The Figure 4.5 describes such hybrid 
attacks of circumventing anyTimeInterrogation filters imposed by network operators. 
Attacker can send Provide Subscriber Info request to the MSC/VLR by impersonating as HLR. 
However this will be treated by MSC/VLR only if the IMSI is provided by the HLR. Since we 
assume that the attacker just knows the MSISDN or phone number of the victim, the attacker 
should get the IMSI first. 
 
Figure 4.5: Location disclosure hybrid attack. 
1. Here the attacker performs previously described SMS message attack to know the MSC 
GT and IMSI. He impersonates as SMSC and sends MAP Send Routing info ForSM to 
HLR by encapsulating MSISDN of victim. 
2. HLR in return responds to the attacker with IMSI and GT of MSC in Send Routing Info 
ForSM acknowledgement message. 
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3. Now since attacker has IMSI of the victim and he knows which MSC to query for cell 
level location information, he impersonates as HLR and sends Provide Subscriber Info 
request message to MSC/VLR. 
4. MSC/VLR will initiate the Paging request to know cell level location details of MS. 
The MS responds with Paging Response. Through Pro-vide Subscriber Info response 
message, it would reveal the cell information to attacker. 
Unlike previous attacks, here the attacker has more chances and accuracy of knowing the 
victim’s location as cell level information provides better location proximity than the location 
details that a MSC GT can reveal. 
4.2.6 Location disclosure using emergency location service (LCS) messages 
To serve the people in case of emergency situations governmental bodies have mandated [45] 
three digit emergency numbers such as 911 (in United States of America) and 112 (in Europe). 
This feature is implemented as per location service guidelines [38]. Dialing 911 or 112 would 
place a free of charge call on behalf of mobile users and accurate location information is 
collected to serve the people in emergency quickly. Often the accurate location is calculated 
either based on Global Positioning System (GPS) technology or based on triangulation between 
cellular towers by considering angle of arrival and time difference of arrival factors of radio 
signals. This can either be used from mobile station side (emergency calls) or from the network 
side (to track criminals, etc.). The attack being discussed here is more related to network side 
location services. The basic message flow of LCS [45] is as below: 
1. An authorized client (e.g. police) can initiate a location service request from a Serving 
Mobile Location Center (SMLC) client. SMLC is a functional element of Base Station 
Controller (BSC) used for location detection of mobile phones in GSM networks.  The 
request includes MSISDN. 
2. This request is directed to Gateway Mobile Location Centre (GMLC). GMLC bridges 
external SMLC clients with core network and hence it authenticates the LCS service 
requests to filter out only legitimate clients.  The GMLC can also request HLR for 
routing information.  SMLC and GMLC functions can be parts of a same network 
entity. 
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3. GMLC sends Provide Subscriber Location Request message to MSC/VLR of visited 
network (VMSC). Though there is no authentication check for this message, address of 
the sender will be verified. The MSISDN will be mapped to IMSI and hence this 
message includes IMSI instead of MSISDN. 
4. VMSC (MSC/VLR of visited network) sends location request to the BSC which in turn 
uses RRLP requests to know the exact cell ID location of the mobile. 
5. The location report received by VMSC includes the exact location of MS. It is en-
capsulated in Provide Subscriber Location ACK message and sent to GMLC. 
6. GMLC then encloses this information in location service response and sends it back to 
SMLC client. 
 
Here the LCS service response will have accurate location of MS including longitude and 
latitude. Hence there is no need to separately map the cell ID to respective geo-location 
coordinates. 
4.2.6.1 Attacks using location service (LCS) messages 
In this attack [44], attacker bypasses the verification check done by GMLC by impersonating 
himself as GMLC to VMSC. Since it requires IMSI corresponding to victim’s MSISDN, the 
attacker initially impersonates as SMSC to HLR and retrieves the IMSI as discussed in section 
3.2.1. The message flow for this attack is represented in the Figure 4.6. 
Communication exchanged during location disclosure attack using LCS messages is described 
below: 
1. Here the attacker performs previously described SMS message attack to know the MSC 
GT and IMSI. He impersonates as SMSC and sends MAP Send Routing INFO FOR SM 
to HLR by encapsulating MSISDN of victim. 
2. HLR in return responds to the attacker with IMSI and GT of MSC in Send Routing 
INFO FOR SM acknowledgement message. 
3. Now since attacker has IMSI of the victim and he queries visited network MSC for 
accurate location information. He impersonates as GMLC and sends Provide 
Subscriber Location req message to MSC/VLR. 
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4. MSC/VLR will initiate the RRLP request to know precise location details of MS. The 
MS responds with RRLP Response. Through Provide Subscriber Location Response 
message, it would reveal the location of victim to attacker. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Location disclosure using LCS messages. 
 
To summarize, the attacks discussed in the sections 4.2.1 to 4.6.1 articulates how an attacker 
with SS7 access can retrieve IMSI and MSC GT just using MSISDN (phone number). The 
global location of MSCs can be narrowed down to more accurate locations either by predefined 
scripts or by querying in public databases such as SHODAN [46] – a computer/network device 
search engine. The attacks shown in 4.2.5.1 and 4.2.6.1 provide more accurate details of the 
victim by providing cell ID of the victim MS. Once the cell ID is known, the attacker can use 
third party APIs [47] to get latitude and longitude of victim’s location and also plot them on a 
map. Some of the examples pertaining to sample trace of a located cell ID and scripts that use 
the aforementioned APIs are given in Appendix C. 
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4.3 Call interception and eavesdropping attacks 
In this section, we discuss how an attacker can intercept a phone call using loopholes in SS7 
protocol. 
4.3.1 Basic call setup workflow during roaming 
As part of mobility management services, international roaming facilities are provided using 
CAMEL [42] specifications. More specifically, mobile operators facilitate international 
roaming within their network using CAMEL Application Part (CAP). This enables the 
operators to provide home network services to visiting subscribers. 
Assuming that a Finnish subscriber is roaming in Estonia and trying to call a Finnish number, 
a basic call setup workflow during roaming is pictorially represented in Figure 4.7. 
1. When the MS is roaming in a new location (different country), it intimates its 
whereabouts (MSC area and GT) to HLR of home network (home country). To serve 
the roaming MS with home network services, the HLR notifies the MSC of visited 
network using insertSubscriberData Request message. This message contains global 
address of gsmSCF from home network and the list of events that has to be reported to 
gsmSCF. Example of the events that has to be reported is calls to home network number 
while roaming. 
2. When the roaming MS wants to make a phone call to a Finnish number, it places the 
call using IAM call setup message toward MSC of visited network. It places the call 
using Finnish national phone number format (e.g.: 046641….). 
3. Since this event has to be reported to gsmSCF as per roaming agreements, the visited 
MSC initiates the CAP Initial IDP message to gsmSCF of home network. 
4. Now the gsmSCF converts the Finnish national phone number format to international 
format as per E.164 specifications [48]. It encapsulates the international phone number 
format (e.g. +358 46641…..) in CAP Connect message and send it across to the visited 
MSC. 
5. Depending on the international phone number format, the visited MSC re-initiates the 
ISUP IAM call set up message to contact the MSC of called party (in home network) 
and the call is established. 
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Figure 4.7: Basic call setup workflow during roaming. 
Various fields of the international phone number format is shown in Figure 4.8: 
 
Figure 4.8: International ITU-T E.164 international phone number format [48]. 
4.3.1.1 Call interception using CAMEL messages 
Here the attacker with SS7 access successfully intercepts the calls made by a roaming mobile 
user by exploiting the loopholes in CAMEL protocol. As a prerequisite for this attack, initially 
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the attack redeems MSC GT of calling MS using the exploits shown in section 3.2.1. Based on 
the dialed MSISDN by victim, the attacker also retrieves MSC GT of ‘called MS’. Since there 
are no plausibility checks made by visited MSC while accepting insertSubscriberData Request, 
the attacker impersonates as home network HLR and injects address of fake gsmSCF. This 
enables the attacker to gain complete control over victim’s (calling party) call from roaming 
net-work. Workflow of call tapping attack [44] is demonstrated in the Figure 4.9: 
1. Initially the attacker tracks the location of victim’s MS using the location privacy 
breach attack described in section 4.1.4.1. This allows him to learn the MSC GT and 
IMSI of calling victim from roaming network. 
2. Then the attacker impersonates as HLR from home network and using insert Sub-
scriber info Request message, he injects the address of fake gsmSCF to MSC along 
with list of events to report. 
3. When the roaming MS in Estonia wants to place a call to a Finnish phone number (in 
Finnish phone number format), it contacts the MSC of its visited network using IAM 
call setup message. 
4. Since calling event has to be reported to gsmSCF as per roaming agreements, the MSC 
contacts the fake gsmSCF address which is injected by the attacker. The MSC sends 
CAP initial IDP message to fake gsmSCF instead of the subscriber’s gsmSCF. 
5. Once the CAP initial IDP message is received, attacker rewrites the MSISDN number 
to number of his recording proxy (e.g. +358 46541…), instead of provided the 
international calling number of ‘called party’ in E.164 format and sends it back to the 
MSC using CAP_Connect message. A recording proxy can be build using open source 
frameworks such as Astrerisk IP PBX [49], which not only helps to record the 
telephonic conversation, but also route them to any other destination over IP network. 
6. Now, instead of actual called party number (+358 46641 …), the MSC initiates call 
setup IAM messages for attacker’s recording proxy (+358 46541…). Attacker bridges 
the call to original called party number (+358 46641….). 
7. Though both parties can talk to each other, since the call is routed through recording 
proxy, the attack observes/records the conversation. 
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This attack works fine until the roaming MS uses the malicious MSC or till the HLR resets 
address of original gsmSFC. However this attack can be carried out only if the international 
network provider is same for both calling and called parties. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Call interception using CAMEL messages. 
4.3.2 Call interception using subscriber profile manipulation 
To receive continuous cellular services, the MS has to updates its location when it moves from 
one location to other. While updating the location, MSC sends its GT along with IMSI 
(collected from MS) Update Location message to HLR. It turn, the HLR provides the 
information needed by MSC to provide cellular services to the MS in context. The information 
sent by HLR mainly includes the subscription profile which allows network operators to charge 
for the services they provide. For the sake of simplicity gsmSCF and gsmSSF are mentioned 
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with a generic term “billing platform” in this attack. Basic message flow when an MS updates 
its location (in presence of a billing platform) is as follows: 
1. When a new MS enters a new MSC/VLR area, the MS registers to the VLR through 
IMSI ATTACH procedures [50]. 
2. The serving MSC/VLR sends the collected IMSI and its own GT to HLR using Up-date 
Location message. 
3. HLR responds back to MSC/VLR with insert Subscriber Data message which contains 
the subscriber’s billing profile. Typically, the subscriber pro-file includes allowed and 
prohibited services; call forwarding settings; billing platform address. Another scenario 
where HLR sends insert subscriber data is when the subscriber changes his billing 
plans. 
4. MSC saves the subscriber profile in its database and confirms it to the HLR using insert 
subscriber data acknowledgement message. 
5. Hereafter, every time a call or SMS is initiated, it will be routed to billing platform to 
enable network operators to charge the MS subscriber for their service. 
4.3.2.1 Call tapping attack using subscriber profile manipulation 
In this attack [8], an attacker can eaves drop over victim’s outgoing calls by injecting a fake 
billing platform address in the MSC/VLR. The attacker routes the call from victim to its actual 
destination and meanwhile records or eavesdropping the call conversations. Since the loophole 
in billing mechanism is used, this attack works only when the victim is placing an outgoing 
call. Unlike the attack demonstrated in 4.2.1.1, the incoming calls cannot be eavesdropped. The 
Figure 4.10 demonstrates the attack in context. 
1. As part of preparation phase, the attacker tracks the location of victim’s MS using the 
location privacy breach attack described in section 4.1.4.1. This allows him to learn the 
MSC GT and IMSI of victim. 
2. Now the attacker impersonates as MSC/VLR and sends update location message to 
HLR by providing victim’s IMSI. 
3. HLR considers this to be a legitimate message thinking that the MS have moved to a 
new location. In return HLR sends insert subscriber data message (contains sub-
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scriber’s profile including billing platform details) to the attacker who is impersonating 
as MSC/VLR. 
4. Once the billing platform address is fetched, the attacker sends another Location Update 
message to same HLR but with GT of actual MSC. By doing this task, the attacker 
allows the original MSC to handle the calls made by victim. 
5. Now the attacker impersonates as HLR and sends insert Subscriber data message to 
original MSC but with a fake billing platform address. This is to manipulate victim’s 
subscriber profile. 
6. Since there is no plausibility check made by MSC on insert Subscriber data message, 
the MSC thinks that the victim has updated his subscription plans and hence accepts by 
sending insert subscriber data acknowledgement message to HLR. 
7. When the victim wants to make a call, it contacts the MSC serving it using MSISDN 
of destination MS. Now the MSC sends Initial IDP message to billing platform address 
provided by the attacker. This in real case enables the billing platform (gsmSCF) to 
start charging for the outgoing call. 
8. The attacker who is impersonating as billing platform, using CAP Apply Charging 
Report to MSC by encapsulating a call rerouting address  as per [51]. This helps the 
attacker to impersonate as a fake MSC and route victim’s call to its original destination 
through SS7 network. 
9. Original MSC routes the IAM call set up message to attacker’s fake MSC address after 
confirming that the billing has begun. 
10. Attacker who is impersonating as MSC would now bridge the call from victim’s MSC 
to original destination by initialization another IAM call set up message. 
 
Since the call is being routed to its original destination, the victim can converse over the call 
with MS of destination. However, the attacker who is actually in the middle can record or 
eavesdrop the call without caller and receiver’s knowledge using the recording proxies. 
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Figure 4.10: Call interception using subscriber profile manipulation. 
4.3.3 GSM/UMTS authentication mechanism 
Though it is not a complete attack using SS7 backbone network, some part of the attack utilizes 
the loopholes of pseudonymity mechanism from core network. However, message exchange 
over RAN networks is omitted as it is out of scope for the thesis text. According to GSM/UMTS 
specification [52], “an intruder cannot deduce whether different services are delivered to the 
same user”. Since IMSI is considered to be a decisive secret, a temporary identity (TMSI) is 
user as a pseudonym to obfuscate IMSI. TMSI is used for encrypting over the air traffic for 
voice calls. However, a new TMSI should be assigned at each change of location. 
The GSM security model relies on a shared secret between HLR and subscriber's SIM. The 
security mechanism contains following elements: 
─ A 128-bit key shared secret- Ki 
─ A 32-bit Signed Response- SRES (obtained using ki) 
─ A Random challenge - RAND (challenge is thrown by MSC) 
  50 
 
─ A 64-bit session key- Kc (for encrypting the communication over RAN) 
When a mobile is switched on, it reports to the network. HLR sends one or more authentication 
triplets <RAND, SRES, Kc> to the serving MSC/VLR. Then the MSC chooses a RAND and 
sends it to the mobile. Using ki stored in the SIM card, the MS generates SRES and sends back 
to MSC. MSC compares the SRES provided by MS and HLR, and if it matches, session key 
Kc is provided to base station. This key is used for encryption for every cellular activity 
thereafter. TMSI is used along with the session key instead of IMSI until a next location update 
is received. Once the location is updated, new TMSI and session keys will generated using the 
same steps. Session key agreement and provision of TMSI is shown in the Figure 4.11. 
 
Figure 4.11: GSM authentication mechanism [53]. 
4.3.3.1 Call tapping attack using TMSI interception 
Research on TMSI usage [54] has revealed that same TMSI will be used repeatedly irrespective 
of MS location update.   The research also revealed that previously established keys are reused 
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for TMSI reallocation. This enables the attacker to perform replay attack and decrypt the 
communication using reused session keys.  
Using OsmocomBB [55], an open Source GSM Baseband software implementation an attacker 
can capture TMSI over the air in RAN. Once the TMSI is captured, pro-vided the same TMSI 
is used for session identification, he can request the HLR to provide session keys by 
impersonating as MSC. The attack [44] workflow is explained in the Figure 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.12: Call interception using TMSI replay attack. 
1. Attacker catches TMSI over air (as it is frequently exchanged compared to IMSI) using 
OsmocomBB. 
2. By impersonating as MSC, the attacker sends MAP send Parameters Request message 
to HLR by encapsulating TMSI. 
3. The HLR/AuC replies back with MAP Send Parameters Response which contains the 
session keys [56]. 
4. The attacker can capture encrypted GSM/UMTS calls and decrypt them using the 
session keys obtained.  
This is a passive attack and it works fine until new session key and TMSI is generated. 
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4.4 SMS based attacks 
In this section, we discuss different types of SMS based attacks that can be done using 
loopholes in SS7 core network. Although there have been plenty of SMS frauds reported, we 
discuss only the attacks which utilizes SS7 completely. 
As described in section 4.1.4.1 (location disclosure using SMS protocol messages), SMS 
protocol includes two parts [57]. When an SMS is initiated from subscriber A, the MS will 
contact its MSC which in turn connects to SMSC using Mobile Originated ForwardSM 
message. SMSC looks up for MSC GT and IMSI of the SMS receiver, and dispatches Mobile 
Terminated ForwardSM message towards destination MSC. The Figure 4.13 explains the two 
faceted SMS mechanism. 
 
Figure 4.13: SMS mechanism in a nutshell. 
Since Mobile Originated ForwardSM and Mobile Terminated ForwardSM  messages are not 
checked for their authenticity, loophole in the SMS protocol leverages the chances of SMS 
based attacks. 
4.4.1 SMS interception using fake MSC 
In this attack [8], the attacker impersonates to HLR as an MSC that is serving the victim. Since 
SMSC inquires HLR for destination MSC details during Mobile Terminated ForwardSM 
procedure, attacker can successfully intercept all the SMS messages intended for victim. This 
attack is represented in the Figure 4.14: 
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Figure 4.14: SMS interception on the receiver end using fake MSC. 
1. As pre-requisite for this attack, the attacker impersonated as SMSC as described in 
section 4.1.4.1 to learn the MSC GT and IMSI of victim. 
2. Once the MSC GT and IMSI of victim is known, attacker impersonates as an MSC 
serving the victim and sends update location message to HLR by providing victim’s 
IMSI. 
3. HLR responds back to the attacker with insert subscriber data message and this shall be 
ignored. 
4. Now assume that subscriber A is sending an SMS to the victim (subscriber B), the MSC 
serving MS A will dispatch Mobile Originated ForwardSM to SMSC. 
5. SMSC contacts the HLR using send Routing info for SM message to know MSC GT 
and IMSI of subscriber B. 
6. Since HLR has stored the attacker as the MSC responsible for subscriber B, it sends 
attacker’s MSC GT to SMSC using send Routing info for SM ACK message. 
7. SMSC thinks that is the legitimate MSC of subscriber B and hence dispatches the SMS 
message using Mobile Terminated ForwardSM message. 
8. Attacker can now receive all SMS message that is destined to subscriber B, the victim. 
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This attack is valid until the victim changes his location area. However as long as HLR stores 
attacker’s  fake MSC as the legitimate MSC serving the victim, the attacker can intercept all 
the SMS chats, one-time passwords, confirmation codes and password recovery messages 
which increases the threats to personal privacy. 
4.4.2 Illegitimate SMS messages 
As mentioned earlier, Mobile Originated ForwardSM and Mobile Terminated ForwardSM 
messages are not checked for their authenticity.  This allows an attacker to send illegitimate 
SMS messages using various methods as follows. 
4.4.2.1 Sending SMS using Mobile Originated ForwardSM messages 
An attacker with access to SS7 network can send SMS messages using loopholes in SMS 
delivery mechanism. This method can be used to perform following tasks: 
─ Fake SMS: An SMS can be sent to any subscriber within the network by faking sender’s 
MSISDN. Here an attacker can also spoof as some legitimate subscriber. 
─ Spam messages: Unsolicited SMS containing commercial advertisement, bogus 
contents can be sent by an attacker. 
─ SMS flooding: An attacker can send large number of messages to one or more 
destinations. The sole purpose of attacker is to slow down the network or to jam mobile stations. 
To perform SMS attacks using Mobile Originated ForwardSM message, the only information 
the attacker has to know is MSC GT and IMSI of destination MS. A basic flow of such an 
attack is represented in the Figure 4.15. 
1. To know MSC GT and IMSI of destination, the attacker uses location privacy breach 
attack described in section 4.1.4.1.  
2. Attacker now impersonates as MSC and sends MSISDN of sender in Mobile Originated 
ForwardSM message to SMSC. 
3. If SM is successfully stored in SMSC, an acknowledgement is sent back to attacker 
with Mobile Originated ForwardSM ACK message. 
4. To deliver SM to the destination, SMSC has to know the MSC location and IMSI of 
the recipient which is stored in the HLR. 
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5. SMSC sends MAP Send Routing Info For SM message to the HLR to query the MSC 
GT/location and IMSI of the recipient. 
6. HLR encapsulates IMSI and MSC location in MAP Send Routing Info For SM ACK 
message and sends it back to the SMSC. Based on this information, SMSC routes the 
SM to the recipient MSC which in turns delivers it to the mobile user using Mobile 
Terminated Forward SM message. 
 
Figure 4.15: Sending illegitimate SMS using Mobile Originated Forward SMmessage. 
This enables the attacker to successfully send an SMS to desired destination. The SMS will be 
billed to the sender, which can be any legitimate MSISDN that the attacker has chosen. 
4.4.2.2 Sending SMS without inter-network agreement 
Attack mentioned in section 4.3.2.1 works fine within the same network. For this attack to work 
outside home network, a roaming agreement should be present between the networks. In 
presence of roaming agreement amongst networks, SMSC of HPLMN would contact the HLR 
of  VPLMN with MAP Send Routing Info For SM  to know the whereabouts (MSC GT along 
with IMSI) of destination MS.  
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However, when there is no roaming agreement amongst the operator, the HLR of VPLMN 
simply ignores Mobile Originated Forward SM message sent by SMSC of HPLMN.  
But the attacker can just execute the mobile terminated part of SMS protocol. In which he can 
just send Mobile Terminated Forward SM message to the destination MS by impersonating as 
SMSC of VPLMN. The Figure 4.16 demonstrates how an attacker can abuse internetwork SMS 
communication. 
 
Figure 4.16: Sending illegitimate SMS using Mobile Terminated ForwardSM message. 
 
1. Attacker learns destination MSC GT and IMSI based on location privacy breach attack 
described in section 4.1.4.1.  
2. Attacker impersonated as SMSC of VPLMN encapsulated destination IMSI and SM in 
Mobile Terminated Forward SM message.  
3. He sends this message to MSC serving the destination and it will be delivered to MS. 
Though the attacker has violated inter operator agreements, the SMS will be success-fully 
delivered to desired destination. However, this incident will be logged in visited network and 
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it will bill the home network for SMS services. This enables the attacker to send free spam 
messages across the network. 
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5 NEW ATTACK TO UNBLOCK STOLEN MOBILE 
DEVICES 
Increase in usage of mobile phones and the relative increase in the number of mobile phone 
thefts have imposed an overhead on securely retrieving the stolen or missing devices. While 
the mobile security researchers try to figure out various mechanisms to track such devices, 
attackers on the other hand are trying to exploit weaknesses in the mobile network system to 
dissipate into the dark side with stolen devices. In this chapter, one of the new attacks proposed 
by the author is described. The following sections explain how the SS7- MAP protocol can be 
misused to help an attacker to unblock the mobile device from the stolen list and use it 
normally. 
5.1 Current status of mobile thefts 
With advancement of recent mobile manufacturing technologies the number of mobile users is 
increasing day by day as mobile phones are becoming more affordable. According to the World 
Bank’s report [58] in 2012 close to three-quarter of world's population including the developing 
countries have access to mobile phones. With the increase in mobile phone users, flourishing 
business in the black market is rising substantially. In United States, 113 phones per minute are 
stolen or lost; which amass about $7 million worth of smart phones on a daily basis. Recent 
survey [59] by Lookout, Inc. - a mobile security company revealed that about 25% of the 
missing phones are left in a public place, where 14% are taken from house or vehicles. 
Surprisingly the numbers of phone thefts happen through pickpocketing which represents 28% 
of missing devices. 
However, mobile telephony industry and regulatory organizations take the issue with device 
theft seriously. In 2004, GSM Association (GSMA) has started a Central Equipment Identity 
Register (CEIR) for methodical recovery or tracking of stolen devices. CTIA -The Wireless 
Association in United States has passed compulsion on equipping remotely operated kill-switch 
technology in all the smartphones manufactured after mid-2015. In spite these advancements 
by technologists to fortify the mobile phone users, attackers have competitively grown to 
exploit the vulnerabilities in existing mobile network communication backend to gain illegal 
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control over stolen/missing devices and the private information on them. There exists a 
growing black market [60] where such devices are sold with least possibility of tracing them. 
5.2 Working principle of EIR 
The EIR stores IMEI which is mobile handset specific. Other identities like IMSI, MSISDN 
and SIM/USIM are subscription specific and they move along with the subscriber when he puts 
purchases a new mobile handset and start using his old card in a new device. Since IMEI 
uniquely identifies individual mobile devices irrespective of subscriber’s network, it eventuates 
for EIR to store the IMEI to track the mobile device. To do so, EIR maintains a database [14] 
e.g. Real Time Database (RTDB) [61] to store the white, black and grey listed IMEI numbers. 
The blacklist contains IMEIs of all those mobile devices which are banned to access the 
network, the grey list contains IMEIs of devices which are allowed to use the network with the 
contingency that they can be tracked for malicious activities; and white list has all those devices 
which are allowed to access the network. The database also facilitates the association between 
IMEIs and IMSIs in many cases. 
Below are the typical interactions [14] that take place when a mobile is switched on or when 
the subscriber moves to a new location. The pictorial representation of this mechanism is shown 
in the Figure 5.1. 
1. The Mobile handset begins the registration process with the Base Station. 
2. Base Station initiates the registration process with MSC/ VLR. 
3. MSC triggers MAP CHECK IMEI message to the EIR before allowing the mobile 
device to register on the network and updating it to HLR. The EIR receives the required 
information (only IMEI or IMEI with IMSI) from the MAP CHECK IMEI message and 
searches in the database for its presence in three different lists that are present there. 
4. Based on the result from the list matching in previous step, MAP CHECK IMEI ACK 
message containing the equipment status specifying whether the IMEI is in blacklist, 
greylist or whitelist. Depending on this, MSC takes appropriate decision about 
registration of the mobile device. 
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Figure 5.1: IMEI check performed by MSC. 
Device detection by EIR is carried out in different methods since this is left to the specific 
implementations and not standardized. Because of this the logic behind such detection is 
completely network operator specific, this attack may not apply to all systems. Often the duplet 
of IMEI and IMSI is sent from the MSC to EIR through MAP CHECK IMEI message. However 
many cases IMEI, IMSI and MSISDN triplet is sent for further security scrutiny in modern day 
implementations. Since only IMEI is mandatory for this operation, it can be assumed, that many 
systems support IMEI-only messages. 
5.3 Attack to unblock stolen mobile devices 
Though there have been guidelines from the telephony regulatory authorities to utilize the 
provision of global level IMEI database through Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR), 
there is no enforcement of this requirement in most countries. Since a complete real-time global 
centralized EIR is not fully operational as of now, mobile stolen in one country can still be used 
in other countries in most of the cases. The attack we present is independent of the database 
type. The attack presented is based on the following conditions: 
 Attacker has a stolen phone which is blacklisted and he knows the IMSI which was 
associated with it while blocking or last use by the victim. The attacker does not need 
to have the original SIM as it is sufficient to have just the IMSI. The IMSI can be 
obtained by active attacks using IMSI catchers while it is in use or using MAP SendIMSI 
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command from the network side (for details see [5], [8] and [44]). We assume that the 
attacker is putting his own SIM card into the phone, which contains a new IMSI. 
 Attacker has access to SS7 core network. This is possible through a compromised edge 
device such as femtocell or badly configured core network node e.g. [62]. Other 
possibilities of getting into SS7 networks are if the attacker is a gaining connection 
through an existing provider with insufficient security checks when renting out their 
SS7 access or through roaming hubs which are insufficiently protected. 
 The Global Title (GT) of the EIR is required, so that the attacker can pose as the MSC. 
The knowledge of the MSC GT is not necessary, but increases the chances of success 
of the attack. The GT can be obtained e.g. GT scanning [7], since operators tend to 
assign GT addresses in blocks; the success rate of such a scan is quite high. If the 
attacker has pre-knowledge of some GT of the targeted operator e.g. obtaining roaming 
interworking confidential material, then this is much quicker. 
We restrict the scope of our attack by defining attacker’s motive at this point is to use the stolen 
device without risk of blocking. 
Now we elaborate on the attack on the EIR which exploits the underlying mechanism when 
MSC sends IMEI along with IMSI during MAP CHECK IMEI. The relationship between those 
two is leveraged for unblocking a mobile device from the stolen list in the database. In such 
cases initially the IMEI is checked to know the list it belongs to. If it is found on the black list, 
an additional check of IMSI is made. If there is a match between IMSI provisioned with IMEI 
in the EIR database (This is the ISMI-IMEI pair in the EIR before the victim blocks his stolen 
device.) with the IMSI found in MAP CHECK IMEI message then this would override the 
blacklist condition [61]. It brings the blacklisted mobile to whitelist and hence allowing the 
registration process to continue. 
This is a sensible feature implemented in EIR to automatically unblock devices that are added 
to blacklist by mistake or by system errors or to reset a device that has gone missing and is 
found again. It logically proves that the victim who blocked the device (through network 
operator) has now got it back and hence the IMEI –IMSI pair now is matching with the last 
entry before blocking. In some EIRs this is maintained to avoid unnecessary blocking in the 
case of mobile handset sharing (e.g. same handset is used with different SIM /UICC cards.) in 
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developing countries. The Figure 5.2 illustrates attack environment along with interaction 
between MSC and EIR. Since this is a focused extension of Figure 5.1; for the sake of clarity, 
interactions beyond MSC in the RAN are excluded. 
 
Figure 5.2: Unblocking using modified MAP Check IMEI message. 
The steps illustrated in Figure 5.2 are explained as follows: 
1. We assume that the check is switched on by default, or the attacker just sends a bunch 
of requests (e.g. if only every 10th time the check is invoked), or he may send his 
request during a low-load period (e.g. nighttime) or the attacker turns on the IMSI 
Check option of EIR. The last one can be done using modern device detection utilities 
such as [63] without disturbing the existing network topology or operation. 
Without any additional authentication check made by EIR while turning on this feature, 
attacker can perform this task. The IMSI Check option mandates the EIR to check IMSI 
if IMEI is found on the blacklist. 
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2. The attacker has access to the original IMSI of victim. The attacker now poses as 
MSC (depending on filtering level at EIR this may require knowledge of MSC GT). 
When attacker-MSC tries to contact EIR, the attacker sends a modified MAP CHECK 
IMEI message where his new IMSI is added and the IMEI is send to the EIR. 
3. Now the EIR parses the attacker’s message from step 2 to derive IMEI and IMSI 
from Message Signal Unit (MSU) [14]. Since each operator can place IMSI information 
in any desired location of the message, the 
ASN1 decoder will searches the IMSI in multiple locations. 
4. Now EIR checks the IMEI derived from step 3 in the EIR database black, grey and 
white lists. Since the IMEI is of stolen device, it will be in the blacklist as we have 
mentioned in the scenario that the victim has blocked his stolen phone. 
5. Since the IMSI Check is activated in the beginning by attacker in context and since 
IMEI is found in blacklist, it uses the IMEI-IMSI pair obtained in step 3 and matches 
against the existing entry of IMEI-IMSI pair for the corresponding IMEI in the EIR 
database. 
6. Since the attacker has replaced his IMSI with original IMSI of victim in step 2, a 
match is found in the RTDB. Hence the IMEI is overridden from the blacklist and 
moved to whitelist. This was only possible since the IMSI was sent in step 2. 
7. Since the IMEI is there in the whitelist, EIR sends CHECK IMEI ACK message back 
to MSC to allow the IMEI to register to the network and use it. That message the 
attacker does not need to receive, it is only a confirmation that the attack worked. 
Now the attacker has unblocked a stolen phone and he can use it without any difficulties. Since 
there is no check on the number of such attempts that we could find, he can run this operation 
every time his mobile is added to the blacklist. Even more simple method is to have his custom 
script running in SS7 network associated with that specific IMEI to replace his IMSI with 
victim’s IMSI every time MSC initiates a CHECK-IMEI procedure. 
A comparison of ASN1 encoding structure of MAP CHECK IMEI message without-IMSI [14] 
and that of with-IMSI (as found in the implementation of [64] is considered for illustration) is 
given in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Variation of MAP Check IMEI message structure [14] [64]. 
The attack proposed in this section is articulated with GSM and UMTS specific terminologies. 
However, EIR is used in higher specifications like LTE and the same attack is possible with no 
or minimum modification. We have demonstrated that the attacker with SS7 network privileges 
can gain unlawful access to use stolen (blocked) mobile phones. 
Some operators ask for a monetary compensation to unblock a mobile device which serves the 
purpose of generating revenue and reimbursement of the additional costs from subscribers, 
which can be avoided if the attacker offers this service in the black market for a lower cost. 
Hence, alongside illegitimate access, the attacker can gain monetary benefits using the SS7 
MAP vulnerability exposed in this attack. 
5.4 Potential countermeasures 
Even with the newer specifications, vulnerabilities that are specific to SS7 are still remained as 
there are functions with similar functionalities in Diameter, but there the usage of IPSec or TLS 
may prevent this attack. Another issue is that often backward compatibility needs to be 
maintained and therefore a downgrading type of attack is potentially possible. The suggested 
potential countermeasures are: 
1. Access control for switching on IMEI validation. 
2. Logging of the activation of the validation feature. 
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3. Filtering on MAP level that the CHECK IMEI request is coming from a known 
internal source (HLR, MSC). 
4. Layer crosschecks; in particular, in particular the source address information in 
“transport layer” SCCP and MAP layer is consistent with each other. 
5. If SS7 is run over IP (SIGTRAN), then the usage of IPSec should be considered, 
according to NDS/IP security [65]. 
Other countermeasures are also possible and above only give a brief outline of a potential 
protection strategy. 
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6 MITIGATION OF ATTACKS 
In this section we discuss various mitigation strategies to secure the system against attacks 
described in Chapter 4. 
6.1 Generic approach for mitigation 
Since mobile core network consists of assorted protocols, applications, platforms and 
implementations, a concrete amalgamation between the underlying systems is required to build 
a defense mechanism against the attacks. A heterogeneous attack management system to 
protect the distributed architecture of telecommunication core network should facilitate secure 
communication infrastructure through authentication, encryption and access control 
mechanisms [13]. A pictorial representation of a strategic infrastructure to defend against SS7 
based attacks in given in the Figure 6.1. The attack management system should incorporate 
tunneling or traffic encryption similar to Virtual Private Network (VPN), for enabling secure 
communication between multiple network entities.  
On the grounds that SSPs are the entry points to SS7 core network from the RAN network, an 
authentication component deployed at each every SSP will restrict the attacks that try to gain 
core network access. A certificate signature mechanism obligated at these components defends 
the system against spoofing attacks which involves impersonation (of MSC/VLR) of core 
network gateways, by filtering only the certified entries to SS7 network.  
On the other hand, since attackers can learn the network infrastructure and take control over 
the entities by intercepting the traffic between SSPs and STPs, positioning a dedicated firewall 
that filters the SS7 interconnection messages would be useful. These firewalls could filter the 
traffic based on well-known attack signatures or behavior based analytics. Alongside, if traffic 
between STPs is re-analyzed with the help of packet analyzer placed after the SS7 firewalls, it 
provides yet another layer of protection to the core telephony network. A dexterous packet 
analyzer module should passively monitor all the traffic between STPs and the information 
gathered from these analyzers can be used to review the firewall filtering policies. Since these 
packet analyzers can seize the malicious SS7 messages that have bypassed the firewalls at 
SSPs. 
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Figure 6.1: SS7 attack management system [13]. 
Since SCPs deal with sensitive data, the messages addressed to SCPs have to be scrutinized 
carefully for their authenticity. An access control module situated just before SCPs can control 
restrict illegitimate messages from unauthenticated network entities. Furthermore, a real-time 
fraud analyzer interfaced with SCPs in conjuncture with the access control module can be 
useful to analyze doubtful messages that have bypassed the access control mechanisms. These 
measures can help to protect the subtle subscriber information residing in the SCPs (such as 
HLR and EIR) from illegitimate accesses. 
For obvious reasons that the above mentioned attack management system has to be 
implemented uniformly throughout all the global SS7 partners, the mitigation strategy may not 
completely protect the core network from all possible attacks. Although, by providing another 
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layer of security, the attack management system discussed in this section can be useful to tackle 
some of the attacks. More concrete mitigation strategies are discussed in the succeeding 
sections. 
6.2 SMS Home Routing 
As articulated in Chapter 4, one of the most common core network message used by the 
attackers involve flaw in the original SMS mechanism. Often the attackers use Send Routing 
Info For SM message as a preparation step for more sophisticated attacks alongside learning 
MSC GT and location of the victim. In original GSM specification [57] for SMS routing, an 
SMSC from HPLMN as well as VPLMN will contact the HLR of home network to know the 
location of MS, so that the SMSC can directly deliver the short message. However, the location 
and MSC GT information provided to an external network operator can be avoided which 
restricts the attacker to use Send Routing Info For SM message for his trickery.  
Instead of relinquishing MSC GT and IMSI of MS directly to the SMSC of VPLMN (or to 
malicious host), the Mobile Terminated Forward SM message from an interconnection 
(roaming partners, other network operators, unknown hosts including attackers)  will be routed 
through an SMS service platform (SMS home router) in the home network. This mechanism is 
termed as ‘SMS home routing’. Rather than using IMSI of receiving MS, Send Routing Info 
For SM message request to HLR will only provide MSISDN of the MS and a 15 digit MT-
SMS Correlation ID [66]. This correlation ID establishes a mutual relationship between Send 
Routing Info For SM and Mobile Terminated Forward SM messages. Structure of MT-SMS 
Correlation ID is given in the Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2: MT-SMS correlation ID [66]. 
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The MCC and MNC are retrieved by the SMS home router using IMSI of receiving MS, 
whereas Sender ID is chosen randomly for security reasons. 
The Figure 6.3 demonstrates the comparison between SMS mechanism with and without home 
routing. 
 
Figure 6.3: (a) SMS delivery without home routing (b) with home routing. 
SMS home routing defends the mobile core network against spoofed or fraud SMS, illegitimate 
location privacy breaches. Furthermore, it also enables value added services between multiple 
network operators and lawful interception of SMS message sent while in another country. 
3GPP TR 23.840 [67] has included the SMS home routing in two modes– non transparent mode 
(enabled where only MT-SMS correlation ID is disclosed to roaming partners) and transparent 
mode at a higher price roaming agreement (where IMSI of the receiver MS is also disclosed 
after  authentication checks). Some of the global operators had issued with IMSI non-disclosure 
for billing purposes and it has been added to the specification lately. However since it is not 
mandated yet, practical implementation roll out is still under progress as it is considered to be 
an advanced feature of SMSC.  
  70 
 
6.3 STP firewalls 
While studying the attacks abusing mobile core network, it was evident that attackers misuse 
the interconnection between multiple operators at STPs. Attackers often masquerade as 
roaming partners and try to establish connection to target STPs by their GT or SSN, and then 
exploit the system by issuing unexpected network internal commands. Such malicious 
activities can be stopped by implementing a sophisticated STP firewall system [5] to monitor 
the interconnection. 
An intuitive firewall can be overlaid onto the existing network; by situating the firewalls at SS7 
interconnect points. An advanced analysis and reporting module accompanying the firewall 
can perform real-time inspection and report it to the firewall for policy changes. Heuristic 
detection and node finger printing can be used to filter out the legitimate core network 
messages. A pictorial representation of STP firewall architecture is given in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: STP Firewall Architecture. 
6.4 Best Practices 
Some of the best practices that can be incorporated by both mobile network operators and 
providers are enlisted below: 
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1. High priority messages like Any Time Interrogation and MAP Send Parameters is 
purely internal. Hence any such message from an external network should be filtered 
out. 
2. Mobile network operators should completely remove dependency on handing over 
subscriber IMSI and MSC GT to external networks. This mechanism can be adapted 
using proper implementation of SMS home routing and optimal routing within the 
network. This forbids the attackers at first place from executing interception and 
fraudulent attacks as they cannot locate their victims. 
3. Messages like Insert Subscriber Data should be processed only after authenticating the 
origin of the message. In case if they are originated from external networks or APIs, 
such requests should be denied. 
4. During handovers, it is observed that the attacker exploits the system by intercepting 
network internal messages before the completion of TCAP handshake. By enforcing 
MSC/VLR to prosecute the changes requested by the MSCs only after the TCAP 
handshake completion [68]. 
5. Any information being sent out of HLR should be filtered based on checking the origin 
of requester. Messages such as Update Location have to be checked with the previous 
MSC/VLR to confirm the legitimacy of new VLR. 
6. Network operators without roaming agreements should be blocked at interconnect 
STPs. Transport layer firewalls (Layer 2 firewalls) as part of SCCP Routing Control 
(SCRC) to enforce legitimate GT and SSN routing [69] can be implemented to provide 
more security to the system. This firewall can also be accompanied with application 
level firewalls (Layer 7 firewalls) to filter out malicious MAP, CAP and supplementary 
(SS) service messages. 
7. Mobile operators should educate their subscribers to be aware of RAN network attacks 
such as IMSI catchers, fake base stations and silent SMS by enforcing them to use user 
applications such as ‘SnoopSnitch’ [70] and ‘Darshak’ [71]. 
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7 FUTURE RELEVENCE OF THE ATTACKS 
7.1 3G, 4G and beyond 
Mobile phone attacks have become very common these days with the end of walled garden era 
where only a select few could access the telecommunication backbone. In spite the 
advancement in mobile standards, GSM is still the most widely deployed cellular standard in 
the world, as the newer 3GPP standards maintain backward compatibility with it. Though the 
four decades old SS7 is slowly being replaced by the newer Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
and Diameter protocols, the old protocol is still used and supported in the majority of 
telecommunications networks. The attacks analyzed as part of the thesis have proved that SS7 
vulnerabilities will serve as tool for attackers against the backward-compatible networks. 
Earlier chapters provide a detailed analysis of multiple attack vectors against the mobile core 
network. An attacker can exploit the interconnection between multiple network operators, and 
disrupt the cellular services, as well cause significant losses to the telecommunication industry. 
Just with the victim's phone number, the attacker can trace his location, interrupt the cellular 
services to which the victim has subscribed, and intercept the communication without being 
noticed by the operators or the victim. A strong requirement for preserving personal privacy of 
the mobile subscribers has become top priority of mobile operators. 
Some of the publicly available documents such as [72], [73] and [74] demonstrate the 
protection capabilities of mobile networks along with the global risk to the telecommunication 
sector and to the users. These documents rate the mobile network in terms of their protection 
capabilities (against the attacks analyzed in the thesis) relative to a reference mobile network 
[74] that implements all the protection or mitigation measures that have been outlined in 
chapter 6. It is evident from this analysis that the telecommunication networks have not 
implemented the latest security measures to protect their subscribers. As we have also seen in 
this thesis, such measures would be urgently needed.  
Though SS7 protocol seems to be outdated, vulnerabilities in SS7 have affected newer 
standards such as UMTS and LTE. SS7 enables the exchange of encryption keys and, hence, 
even the UMTS encrypted communication over RAN can also be decrypted by mounting the 
attack analyzed in section 4.2.3. The fact that SS7 enables a 3G IMSI catcher is quite significant 
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[5]. Contrary to all the attacks analyzed in this thesis against the mobile core network, there 
exist a large number of attacks that exploit other vulnerabilities in SIM cards [75] and the 
mobile Internet (GPRS) [76] as well as enable sniffing the RAN traffic [77]. Even with the 
implementation of the latest cryptography standards, mobile phones are still prone to 
clandestine surveillance programs, as the encryption keys used at the root level (SIM cards) are 
too short [75] to resist cyber espionage.    
As explained in chapter 4, the attackers exploit basic cellular service workflow such as voice 
calls and text messages, and hence not all the SS7 attacks can be blocked with simple filtering 
as it might affect the regular working mechanisms of telecommunication systems. Furthermore, 
attacks on value-added services such as Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD), 
which  is used for monetary transactions can incur considerable financial loss to the victim [8] 
or wipe out personal data from the phone [78]. Since banks and other governmental agencies 
are also involved [77] besides the mobile phone subscribers, USSD-based attacks can be 
catastrophic to a larger community. Considering the features with wide range of service 
subscriptions, USSD is going to be the target of telecommunication fraud. Additionally, 
Multimedia Messaging Services (MMS) ports the design specification of SMS protocol and, 
hence, most of the SMS based attacks (section 4.3) can be potentially be extended to the MMS 
protocol. 
7.2 Diameter protocol replacing SS7 
Newer standards such as 4G are moving towards ‘all-IP’ connections and the IP based Diameter 
protocol [34].  Since the IP-based signaling protocols by default use IPsec to authenticate 
connections, they have higher chances of providing sufficient security than SS7, which has no 
such protection. However, there is also the possibility that the IP-based attacks from the Internet 
could be replicated in the telecommunication networks.   
Diameter addresses a broader range of emerging technologies than just cellular access, such as 
Mobile IP and the Internet of Things (IoT). Diameter was designed to resolve the issues with 
its predecessor, Radius, by improving the authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) 
functionality. Since any node within the Diameter system can initiate a request, Diameter is 
considered to be a peer-to-peer (P2P) communication protocol. The AAA functionality is 
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incorporated with the help of a Network Authentication Server (NAS) and a shared 
authentication server [34]. Being a P2P network, every node within the Diameter system can 
act as a client or a server depending on the network deployment. Every peer within the system 
uses dynamic peer discovery strategies including peer tables [79], which removes the need for 
the manual configuration of the NAS.  Diameter can use the SCTP or Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) as the transport layer protocol. 
One of the key measures to protect the core telecommunications network against network 
breaches is by hiding the critical elements from outside exposure. In SS7, the Global Title 
Translation (GTT) functionality [4] helps to achieve network exposure by reducing the need of 
disclosing the entire network’s element addresses in the routing tables of each and every node 
of the network. GTT hides the critical infrastructure such as HLR and EIR, as STPs can resolve 
the actual addresses of these elements using internal routing tables. This concept in Diameter 
protocol is implemented by default in the Home Subscriber Service (HSS) which takes care of 
GTT as well as mutual network terminal authentication. GTT and mutual terminal 
authentication jointly can protect the system against SCTP port scanning (section 3.2) and 
impersonation attacks. 
Another concern of the GSM/UMTS core networks is mapping the boundaries of the core 
network by an attacker by penetrating deeper into the network using vulnerable ports exploiting 
the interconnection gateways. The Diameter protocol prevents such penetration by topology 
hiding [67] in terms of critical infrastructure as well as routing paths. When an internetwork 
message is sent outside the HPLMN, the STP router replaces the internal (actual) address of 
the network entity with a generic address which can only be resolved by that STP. This helps 
hide global IP addresses from the view of an attacker who is trying to gain access to mobile 
core network. This not only prevents the attacker from accessing internal elements but also 
prevents man-in-the middle (MitM) attacks. As part of backward compatibility, mobile 
operators have to support interconnection of GSM/UMTS to LTE systems. Address resolution 
during roaming between the 2G/3G MAP protocol and LTE Diameter is handled by the 
Interworking Function (IWF) interfaces [80]. 
Contrary to SS7, the Diameter protocol ensures secure connection between the entities of the 
core network by IP Security (IPSec) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) that authenticate and 
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encrypt the internal traffic. Diameter uses the TLS handshake protocol [81], which utilizes 
X.509 [82] certificates and asymmetric cryptography to authenticate the peers which are part 
of communication. Since the traffic is encrypted, an attacker who has already gained access to 
the core network cannot intercept the transmission between network entities [83]. 
Authentication between the peers in the Diameter protocol makes it comparatively more secure 
than SS7. Diameter uses Network Access Identifier (NAI), Challenge Handshake 
Authentication Protocol (CHAP), Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and Password 
Authentication Protocol (PAP) for authentication [84]. The option of specifying Hop-by-Hop 
and End-to-End identifiers [85] in the message packets ensures a secure routing path as well as 
end to end security. 
With the AAA mechanism in place, Diameter appears to be more secure than SS7 whose 
purpose was communication within trusted network. One of the key issues with the Diameter 
specifications is that, though it standardizes the use of IPSec and TLS in mobile 
communication,  using them is not mandatory [34]. Also, there is no procedure to verify 
whether IPSec or TLS have been used underneath the Diameter implementation [18] of 
VPLMN. Moreover, being a P2P protocol, Diameter is application based. The rate at which 
Diameter can send or handle messages and the disclosure of interconnected peers or routes are 
dependent on the application. The packets that a Diameter system can send depend on the 
application that generates them rather than network settings. In such application driven 
environments, if there is insufficient traffic to piggyback the acknowledgement messages [84]; 
the underlying TCP or SCTP protocols may cause more traffic with encrypted data. 
Furthermore, the application decides the penetration or reachability of the signaling messages 
[18]. The attacker can impersonate at the application level and penetrate deeper into the core 
network. Hence Diameter cannot completely ensure the core network security against spoofing 
and interception during interconnection.  
Additionally, Diameter uses the X.509 certificate and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for 
authentication; the common the problems of PKI such as distribution of public keys, 
management of certificates and verification of certificate revocation continue to create the 
security administration overhead in core networks [34].  Yet another issue with Diameter 
protocol is that, it does not secure the system against DoS attacks. Though the peers can 
recognize the malicious flooding messages, the failover algorithms within Diameter 
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implementation try to respond to the attacker with error messages. The attacker can exploit this 
vulnerability to submerge the target peer with flooding messages and hence execute a 
successful DoS attack. 
Many of SS7 design features including some flaws have been replicated in the Diameter 
protocol. GSM/UMTS systems take most of the market share (in terms of inter-operator 
roaming) compared to hardly a handful of LTE roaming implementations. Since GSM/UMTS 
along with SS7 will continue to rule the core network domain for probably the next couple of 
decades, the positive changes that Diameter could affect to the core network are not huge. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
Telecommunication network is an intricate system made up of diverse subsystems built on 
different technologies. While legacy systems are there to survive for the years to come, the 
security of the whole system can be defined by the security level of the weakest link and 
partner. The SS7 protocol was built for signaling between a handfuls of trusted 
telecommunication partners, but it is still being used in the backbone of mobile communication 
with an open market for new operators to serve more than half of the world population. Even 
though the walled garden era of trusted partners has been ended with advancement of 
technologies, SS7 may still continue to dominate mobile core network system for at least the 
next few years. Moreover, integration of Internet technologies with telecommunication systems 
have produced new ways for attackers to penetrate into the system. Popular hardware, software 
and operating systems on personal computers provide the same functionality as sophisticated 
equipment used in earlier day’s telecommunication environment, which means that the attacks 
no longer limited by access to hardware or software.  
The thesis introduced the problem and goals in chapter 1. Chapter 2 gave a brief description of 
signaling systems, the various internal components of the core network, and the addressing 
schemes used within the mobile core network. This chapter provided an insight to the real life 
components of telephony network, rather than just providing a logical abstraction of the 
underlying architecture. Furthermore, chapter 3 established a connection from the core network 
architecture to attack strategies that can be used to get into the system. It also outlined how an 
attacker can penetrate to the SS7 backbone using the advanced features of SIGTRAN and SCTP 
protocols. Since an outside attacker can exploit open entry points and map the periphery of 
core network, the risks of such attacks are worth researching. Additionally, chapter 3 also 
summarized the relaxations of the telecommunication laws which allow anyone including 
fraudsters to lawfully enter the mobile communication backend.  
Chapter 4 explained various methods to manipulate mobile traffic for different types of attacks 
ranging from tracking the victim in real-time to intercepting all of his mobile communication. 
With the help of various flow diagrams, it was explained that, by just having victim’s phone 
number, an attacker can breach the privacy and cause financial loss to the victim as well as to 
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mobile operators. Chapter 5 demonstrated one of the new attacks found by the author, using 
which a core network attacker can unblock stolen phones for selling them into the black market. 
The attack exploits the relationship between the mobile phone identifier (IMEI) and the 
subscriber identity (IMSI) to gain illegitimate access to the equipment identity register (EIR) 
module. Since this type of exploitation has so far been ignored by the telecom operators, a 
recommendation to GSMA was made (based on the analysis of this thesis) to filter-out the 
malicious attack messages. 
Chapter 6 articulated several mitigation strategies to defend the core network against the attacks 
explained in chapter 4. This chapter explained a security architecture and mechanisms to block 
malicious messages from an attacker at suitable gateways without affecting the normal 
functioning of the underlying system. Since most of the attacks use message which are part of 
basic cellular services, a malfunctioning mitigation mechanism could incur a huge financial 
loss to the network operators.  
As part of the discussion, chapter 7 emphasizes how a protocol specific to an older cellular 
standard can cause catastrophic degradation of security measures incorporated in newer 
standards. An overview of state of the art security is outlined by describing numerous different 
attack vectors which are out of scope of the thesis. In chapter 7, limitations and advantages of 
the Diameter protocol, the successor of SS7 in LTE standards, was explained. Though 
Diameter appears to be more appealing in terms of security, the potential extension of the 
known attacks in chapter 7 highlighted the need for strict scrutiny of Diameter specifications 
before it is implemented on a global scale. 
Complexity of network layers and diversity of protocols in the telecommunication field makes 
it more difficult to find all loopholes in the systems. Even with in-depth knowledge and 
expertise, providing complete security solutions to end users as well as to mobile operators is 
a major challenge. However, if the telecommunications operators ignore the early stage 
disclosures of core network attacks, such as the new attack presented in this thesis, undoubtedly 
many end subscribers or even entire nations can become victims of attackers. 
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APPENDIX A 
Client-server communication using SCTP sockets. 
 
#SCTP_client.py 
import sctp 
import socket 
import binascii 
soc = sctp.sctpsocket_tcp(socket.AF_INET) 
soc.bind(('127.0.0.1', 2906)) 
soc.connect(('127.0.0.1', 2905)) 
print("****************************************") 
print("********* This is SCTP Client **********") 
print("****************************************") 
print("\n") 
print("* Sending M3UA ASPUP") 
soc.send(binascii.unhexlify('0100030100000008')) 
buf = soc.recv(1024) 
print("* Received: %s" % binascii.hexlify(buf)) 
print("\n") 
soc.close() 
 
# M3UA_Server.py 
 
import sctp 
import socket 
import binascii 
soc = sctp.sctpsocket_tcp(socket.AF_INET) 
soc.bind(('127.0.0.1', 2905)) 
soc.listen(5) 
ear, (ip, port) = soc.accept() 
buf = ear.recv(1024) 
print("****************************************") 
print("********* This is M3UA Server **********") 
print("****************************************") 
print("\n") 
print("* Received: %s" % binascii.hexlify(buf)) 
print("* Sending M3UA ASPUP ACK") 
ear.send(binascii.unhexlify('0100030400000008')) 
print("\n") 
ear.close() 
soc.close() 
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Recorded interactions between SCTP client and M3UA_Server 
 
 
4-way Handshake 
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Intercepting SMS protocol messages in wireshark 
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APPENDIX B 
Message manipulation using Scapy. 
#Sample code in Scapy to control every field of SCTP message 
send(IP(dst="127.0.0.1")/ 
SCTP(sport=2600,dport=2500)/ 
SCTPChunkInit(type=1)/ 
SCTPChunkParamAdaptationLayer()/ 
SCTPChunkParamCookiePreservative()/ 
SCTPChunkParamFwdTSN()/ 
SCTPChunkParamIPv4Addr()/ 
SCTPChunkParamUnrocognizedParam()/ 
SCTPChunkParamECNCapable()/ 
SCTPChunkParamHearbeatInfo()/ 
SCTPChunkParamHostname()/ 
SCTPChunkParamStateCookie()) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Disclosure of MSC monitored in Wireshark. 
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Disclosure of location ID 
 
 
 
Sample codes of unwired labs location API 
# Sample Request of MS1 
 
{ 
    "token": "101472503351", 
    "radio": "gsm", 
    "mcc": 244, 
    "mnc": 12, 
    "cells": [{ 
        "lac": 123, 
        "cid": 1650204 
    }], 
    "address": 1 
} 
 
# Sample Response for the requested cell information 
 
{ 
  viii 
 
    "status": "ok", 
    "balance": 44, 
    "lat": 60.187519, 
    "lon": 24.838402, 
    "accuracy": 959, 
    "address": "Unnamed Road, 02150 Espoo, Finland" 
} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# Sample request for MS2 using 3rd party API 
 
import requests 
 
url = "http://eu1.unwiredlabs.com/v2/process.php" 
 
payload = "{\"token\": \"101472503351\",\"radio\": \"gsm\",\"mcc\": 
244,\"mnc\": 5,\"cells\": [{\"lac\": 29120,\"cid\": 
278766}],\"address\": 1}" 
response = requests.request("POST", url, data=payload) 
 
print(response.text) 
 
